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1. Introduction	  	  
	  
The	   role	   science	   can	   play	   in	   society	   is	   discussed	   controversially	   in	   the	   social	   science	  
literature.	   In	   a	   complex	   and	   sophisticated	   world,	   more	   and	   more	   decisions	   rely	   on	   the	  
expertise	  of	  specialists.	  Subjects	  like	  genetic	  research	  or	  on	  environmental	  threats	  contain	  a	  
high	   amount	   of	   uncertainty	   that	   require	   the	   input	   of	   scientists	   holding	   expertise	   in	   the	  
respective	   issue	   areas	   (Nelkin	   1975,	   Resnik	   2009).	   Hence,	   politicians	   who	   lack	   relevant	  
information	   for	   their	   decisions	   have	   a	   high	   demand	   for	   specific	   knowledge.	   Scientific	  
knowledge	   is	   seen	  as	  adequate	   to	  enable	  decision	  makers	   to	   judge	   the	   relevant	   issue	  and	  
guarantee	  scientific	  based	  choices	  in	  the	  end.	  
Following	  this	  assumption	  social	  scientists	  have	  especially	  addressed	  the	  questions	  if	  science	  
is	   objective	   and	   neutral,	   and	   how	   to	   structure	   the	   science-­‐policy-­‐interaction	   to	   generate	  
political-­‐relevant	  knowledge	  while	  maintaining	  the	  credibility	  of	  science.	  One	  position	  in	  the	  
argument	   has	   put	   emphasis	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   scientific	   knowledge	   is	   neither	   superior	   to	  
society	   nor	   objective,	   but	   socially	   embedded	   and	   thus	   always	   reflecting	   social	   values	  
(Jasanoff	   and	   Wynne	   1998,	   Jasanoff	   1990,	   Knorr-­‐Cetina	   2002).	   Others	   think	   that	   science	  
generates	   objective	   and	   value-­‐free	   expertise,	   to	   inform	  decision	  makers	   about	   the	   origins	  
and	  extent	  of	  a	  problem	  (Haas	  1992;	  2001;	  2007).	  The	  latter	  position	  assumes	  that	  because	  
scientific	   knowledge	   steams	   from	   an	   elevated	   position,	   it	   can	   guide	   the	   decision	   making	  
process.	  Knowledge	  therefore	  must	  be	  presented	   in	   the	   form	  of	  consensual	  knowledge.	   In	  
sum	   this	   so-­‐called	   linear	   model	   assumes	   that	   the	   function	   of	   science	   is	   to	   reduce	  
uncertainty1	  and	  deliver	  scientific	  consensual	  knowledge	  about	  the	  causes	  and	   impact	  of	  a	  
problem	   (Pielke	   2007:	   13,	   Haas	   1992:	   4,	   Adler	   and	   Haas	   1992:	   371).	   “Political	   decision	  
makers	   are	   brought	   into	   a	   position	   that	   allows	   them	   to	   identify	   their	   interests	   and	  
preferences“(Haas	  2001:	  11579).	  	  	  	  	  	  
While	   the	   linear	   model	   occupied	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   the	   academic	   discussion,	   several	  
scholars	  have	  criticized	  it.	  Some	  were	  critical	  about	  ignoring	  the	  social	  dimension	  of	  scientific	  
knowledge	  (Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1997)	  while	  others	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  scientific	  consensus	  
alone	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   influence	   political	   decisions	   (Underdal	   2000:	   30).	   Although	   the	  
linear	   model	   is	   under	   critical	   review,	   this	   has	   not	   affected	   its	   empirical	   prevalence	   (Beck	  
2009,	  2010).	  	  	  
An	  issue	  weakly	  addressed	  in	  this	  discussion	  is,	  how	  knowledge	  created	  by	  scientific	  bodies	  
affects	   relevant	   political	   decisions	  makers.	   Predominantly,	   the	  main	   analytical	   focus	   is	   on	  
how	   (institutional)	   arrangements	   between	   scientists	   and	   decision	   makers	   shape	   the	  
outcomes	   of	   that	   dialogue.	   Derived	   from	   this,	   how	   can	   the	   dialogue	   to	   secure	   scientific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  When	  I	  use	  the	  term	  uncertainty	  in	  this	  paper,	  I	  perceive	  it	  as	  a	  condition	  in	  which	  decision	  makers	  have	  to	  act	  
under	   a	   high	   level	   of	   ignorance.	   Ignorance	   means	   the	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   about	   an	   object/field,	   so	   that	  
politicians	  cannot	  develop	  preferences	  or	  aims.	  Therefore,	  following	  decision	  theory,	  I	  presume	  decisions	  have	  
to	  be	  made	  under	  circumstances	  of	   incomplete	   information	   (Mag	  1990:	  9).	  The	  definition	  used	   in	   this	  paper	  
nevertheless	   goes	   beyond	   that	   by	   assuming	   that	   decision	  makers	   in	   this	   phase	   also	   face	   a	   lack	   of	   possible	  
courses	  of	  action.	  Furthermore	  they	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  prospective	  outcomes	  of	  their	  action.2	  Because	  of	  all	  
this,	   decisions	  makers	   require	   expert	   advice	   to	   reduce	   uncertainty	   and	   thus	   complexity,	   to	   gain	   prospective	  
actions	  for	  decision	  making	  (Bolin	  1997).	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independence	   be	   structured	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   maintain	   the	   political	   relevance	   of	  
scientific	  consensual	  knowledge	  on	  the	  other?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  shift	  the	  focus	  from	  the	  science-­‐policy-­‐interaction	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  
impact	  of	  scientific	  consensual	  knowledge.	  Little	  has	  been	  said	  so	  far	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  
consensual	   knowledge	   on	   decision	   makers.	   For	   this	   purpose	   I	   will	   develop	   a	   theoretical	  
model	  of	  how	  decision	  makers	  process	  new	  knowledge	  (be	  it	  scientific	  or	  else).	  This	  central	  
concern	  of	  my	  paper	  is	  rooted	  in	  one	  central	  deficit	  of	  the	  linear	  model	  that	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  
scientific	  knowledge	  can	  diffuse	  into	  the	  political	  process	  (Chwieroth	  2007:	  444,	  Smith	  1999:	  
143,	  Risse	  1994:	  187).	  The	  linear	  model	  follows	  a	  top	  down	  approach	  by	  treating	  consensual	  
knowledge	  as	  the	   independent	  variable.	  Consequently	  the	  success	  of	  science	  with	  decision	  
makers	   is	   grounded	   in	   science	   itself.	   In	   this	   structural	  explanation	  a	   scientific	   consensus	   is	  
sufficient	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  	  	  
Contrary	   to	   that,	   I	   take	   scientific	   consensual	   knowledge	   as	   the	   starting	   point.	   The	   linear	  
model	  states	  that	  a	  scientific	  consensus	  can	  lead	  to	  political	  decisions	  by	  providing	  politicians	  
with	  the	  relevant	  information.	  However	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  
on	   decision	  makers	   requires	   an	   agency-­‐based	   approach.	   This	   assumption	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
idea	   that	   decision	   makers	   are	   not	   impartial	   in	   their	   perception	   of	   knowledge.	   Scientific	  
knowledge,	   especially	   under	   conditions	   of	   uncertainty,	   can	   be	   influential	   but	   it	   is	   not	   the	  
independent	   variable:	   Instead,	   my	   principal	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   influence	   of	   (scientific)	  
knowledge	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   individual	   perceptions	   of	   decision	   makers,	   which	   are	   a	  
result	   of	   the	   decisions	   maker’s	   social	   embeddedness.	   This	   assumption	   originates	   from	  
cognitive	  approaches	  that	  highlight	  the	  role	  of	  individual	  knowledge	  perception	  (Goldgeier,	  
Tetlock	  2001).	  Perception	  therefore	  guides	  the	  behavior	  of	  individuals	  (Jervis	  1976,	  Sullivan	  
et	   al.	   2002).	   One	   strand	   of	   cognitive	   theory	   dealing	   especially	   with	   decisions	   under	  
uncertainty	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   new	   knowledge	   is	   schema	   theory	   (Anderson	   1977).	   In	  
short,	   schema	   theory	   asserts	   that	   schemata	   are	   mental	   constructions,	   which	   guide	   the	  
selection	  and	  procession	  of	  (new)	  information.	  In	  consequence,	  schemata	  function	  as	  a	  kind	  
of	  predetermined	  map	  navigating	  the	  knowledge	  perception	  of	  an	  individual.	  	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   schema	   theory	   can	   explain	   the	   role	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   in	   the	   political	  
process	   stating	   that	   scientific	   knowledge	   activates	   the	   correlating	   schemata	   of	   decision	  
makers.	  This	  theoretical	  argument	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  
on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  influence	  on	  climate	  change	  negotiations.	  Climate	  change	  provides	  
the	  ideal	  conditions	  for	  theory	  testing.	  The	  debate	  about	  climate	  change	  was	  surrounded	  by	  
a	   high	   degree	   of	   uncertainty.	   To	   reduce	   this	   uncertainty	   the	   heads	   of	   government	  
established	   the	   IPCC	   as	   an	   independent	   scientific	   panel	   to	   feed	   the	   political	   process	  with	  
expertise.	   Early	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   climate	   change	   politics,	  we	   can	   observe	   a	   stable	   IPCC	  
consensus	   but	   different	   (re)action	   of	   states	   toward	   binding	   international	   agreement.	   This	  
raises	  the	  question	  of	  how	  expert	  knowledge	  was	  interpreted	  and	  used	  by	  decision	  makers.	  	  
Regarding	  my	  case	  selection	  Germany	  was	  chosen	  as	  a	  “case	  of	  success”.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  
of	   international	   climate	   change	   negotiations	   Germany	   has	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	  
negotiating	   strong	   binding	   agreements.	   Self-­‐commitments	   to	   ambitious	   national	   and	  
European	   emission	   reduction	   goals	   made	   the	   rhetorical	   performance	   more	   robust.	   This	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progressive	   role	   can	   be	   observed	   throughout	   the	   whole	   history	   of	   international	   climate	  
change	  negotiations.	  	  
Concerning	   the	   structure	   of	  my	   paper,	   I	   first	   develop	  my	   theoretical	   argument	   in	   chapter	  
two	   and	   derive	   hypotheses	   for	   my	   empirical	   test.	   In	   chapter	   three	   I	   reflect	   on	   my	   case	  
selection	   followed	   by	   a	   brief	   note	   on	   methods	   used	   for	   my	   empirical	   investigation.	   In	  
chapter	  four	  the	  results	  of	  my	  survey	  on	  Germany’s	  international	  climate	  change	  policy	  from	  
1994	  till	  2009	  are	  presented.	  In	  chapter	  five	  I	  outline	  my	  results	  while	  draw	  a	  conclusion	  in	  
chapter	  six.	  	  
	  
2. Theoretical	  approach:	  Schema	  theory	  	  
	  
Few	   scholars	   would	   deny	   that	   individual	   perception	   plays	   a	   central	   role	   in	   determining	  
decision-­‐making	   processes.	   Cognitive	   theorists	   echoed	   this	   argument	   to	   challenge	   the	  
rational-­‐choice	  models	  dominant	  in	  political	  science	  (Tetlock	  1999:	  335).	  Cognitive	  theorists	  
especially	   query	  whether	   actors	   are	   capable	   to	   rationally	   draw	   conclusions	   from	   complex	  
information	   coming	   from	   diverse	   resources.	   Dissenting	   cognitive	   theorists	   highlight	   the	  
influence	  of	  belief	   systems,	  worldviews	  etc.	   (Shannon	  2012).	  De	  Mesquita	  et	  al.	   state	   that	  
situations	   of	   uncertainty	   increase	   the	   influence	   of	   perception	   and	  make	   it	   central	   for	   the	  
individual’s	   beliefs	   to	   new	   evidence	   (1997:	   16).	   Schema	   theory,	   a	   strand	   of	   cognitive	  
approaches,	   claims	   that	   the	   interpretation	  of	   new	   (scientific)	   knowledge	   is	   determined	  by	  
the	  schema	  which	  individuals	  attribute	  to	  them.	  This	  assumption	  differs	  from	  other	  cognitive	  
approaches	  because	   it	   draws	   a	   connection	  between	  a	  pre-­‐existing	   cognitive	   structure	   and	  
the	  processing	  of	  new	  information.	  	  Many	  other	  cognitive	  approaches	  have	  wider	  concerns	  
as	  they	  deal	  with	  worldviews	  and	  belief	  systems	  (Kuklinski	  1991:	  1342).	  	  	  	  	  	  
Schema	   theory	   is	   a	   concept	   developed	   by	   the	   educational	   psychologist	   R.	   C.	   Anderson	  
(1977).	  Anderson	  was	  not	  the	  first	  who	  used	  the	  term	  schema:	  the	  psychologist	  Jean	  Piaget	  
had	   already	   introduced	   it	   –	   I	   will	   take	   this	   up	   later.	   In	   political	   science,	   schema	   theory	  
became	  prominent	   in	   the	   80s	   (Conover	   and	   Feldman	   1984,	  Hamill	   et	   al.	   1985;	   Lodge	   and	  
Hamill	   1986)	   and	   has	   been	   further	   developed	   throughout	   the	   90s	   (Hermann	   et	   al.	   1997;	  
Young,	  and	  Schafer	  1998).	  	  	  
Schemata,	   in	  short,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  mental	  abstractions	  that,	  put	  together,	  build	  the	  
cognitive	   structure	   of	   an	   individual.	   The	   cognitive	   structure	   represents	   knowledge	   of	  
different	  stimuli,	  which	  contain	  interrelated	  attitudes	  (Fiske	  and	  Taylor	  1991:	  98).	  Schemata	  
help	   us	   to	   understand	   and	   interpret	   the	   world	   around	   us.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   notice	   that	  
schemata	   guide	   our	   perception	   by	   connecting	   stimuli	   from	   the	   outside	   with	   the	   relevant	  
schemata	  so	  that	  conformation	  is	  achieved.	  Individuals	  tend	  to	  strive	  for	  schema	  consistency	  
“filling	   in	   the	   lacunae	   in	   the	   information	  we	  actually	   have	  with	   the	  properties	  we	  expect”	  
(Kuklinski	  1991:	  1342).	   Individuals	  only	  have	   limited	  capacity	  to	  deal	  with	  new	  information	  
and	   consequently	   use	   previously	   stored	   knowledge	   for	   their	   judgments	   (Conover	   and	  
Feldman	  1984:	  96).	  Schemata	  in	  this	  context	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  humans	  to	  give	  
meaning	  to	  the	  world	  surrounding	  them.	  They	  enable	  the	  individual	  to	  orientate	  in	  different	  
situations	  through	  recognizing	  schemata	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  one´s	  own	  cognitive	  structure.	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Especially	   in	   situations	   where	   information	   is	   unclear	   and	   allows	   for	   ambiguous	  
interpretations,	  schemata	  guide	  the	  encoding	  and	  recognition	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  experiences.	  	  	  
In	   sum,	   schema	   theory	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   mental	   model	   to	   structure	   and	   process	  
information	  considering	  the	  limited	  human	  cognitive	  capabilities	  (Hermann	  et	  al.	  1997:	  406).	  
Conover	   and	   Feldman	   summarize	   the	   different	   functions	   schemata	   have	   for	   human	  
cognition	   (1984:	  96	   f).	  First	   it	  helps	   individuals	   to	  organize	   their	  environment	  by	  making	   it	  
reflecting	   their	   structure.	   Second	   it	   determines	   what	   information	   will	   be	   retrieved	   from	  
memory.	   Third	   it	   helps	   to	   complete	   missing	   information.	   Fourth	   it	   provides	   means	   for	  
problem	  solving.	   Finally	   it	   allows	   judging	  on	  experiences	  made	  by	  comparing	   it	  with	  one´s	  
own	  schemata.	  	  	  	  	  
Having	   said	   all	   this,	   how	   can	   schema	   theory	   be	   used	   to	   explain	   the	   influence	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge	   on	   decision	  makers?	   Schema	   theory	   identifies	   the	  mechanism	   individuals’	   use	  
when	   they	   are	   confronted	  with	   new	   information	   or	   in	  my	   case,	   scientific	   knowledge.	   In	   a	  
situation	  of	  uncertainty	  decision	  makers	  are	  unclear	  about	   their	  preferences	  and	   interests	  
concerning	  a	  new	  political	   issue.	  As	   the	   linear	  models	  suggest	   they	   turn	   to	  science	   to	  gain	  
information	   of	   how	   to	   treat	   the	   new	   issue	   (Haas	   1992).	   As	   schema	   theory	   proposes,	   the	  
knowledge	   produced	   by	   science	   will	   hardly	   be	   accepted	   unprejudiced	   and	   directly	  
implemented	  into	  the	  policy	  process.	  New	  information	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  activation	  of	  different	  
stimulus	  of	  schemata	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  cognitive	  structure	  of	  the	  individual.	  	  
	  
Deduced	  for	  the	  preceding	  theoretical	  remarks	  my	  first	  thesis	  states	  that:	  
	  
T1:	   New	   information	   delivered	   by	   science	   activates	   schemata	   of	   decision	   makers,	  
which	  determine	  their	  perception	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
Following	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   it	   seems	   clear,	   that	   new	   information	   is	   processed	   by	   prior	  
knowledge	   of	   an	   individual.	   This	   consequently	   leads	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   and	   which	  
schema	  occurs.	  To	  answer	  this	  question	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  Piaget,	  whom	  I	  already	  mentioned	  in	  
the	   beginning	   of	   my	   remark	   about	   schema	   theory.	   Piaget	   first	   used	   the	   item	   schema	   to	  
explain	  and	  research	  cognition	  of	  scientific	  assumptions	  (Scharlau	  2007:	  80).	  For	  Piaget	  the	  
cognitive	   structure2,	   which	   is	   composed	   of	   different	   schemata,	   is	   the	   central	   element	   of	  
human	   cognition	   and	   understood	   as	   the	   unconscious	   basic	   condition	   for	   the	   control	   of	  
human	  awareness	  and	  its	  behavior	  patterns	  (Piaget	  1968:	  14).	  It	  allows	  the	  interaction	  of	  an	  
individual	  with	  reality	  (Seiler	  1994:	  62).	  	  
Central	  in	  this	  process	  are	  the	  elements	  of	  assimilation	  and	  accommodation.	  Both	  elements	  
allow	   humans	   to	   interact	   with	   their	   environment	   and	   are	   responsible	   for	   acquiring	  
knowledge	  (Piaget	  1976).	  Assimilation	  indicates	  the	  cognition	  of	  objects	  or	  processes,	  which,	  
because	   they	   are	   similar	   to	   already	   existing	   schemata	   of	   the	   cognitive	   structure,	   can	   be	  
internalized	  by	  the	  individual	  without	  cognitive	  resistance.	  The	  integration	  of	  new	  objects	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	   term	  cognitive	   structure	   is	  not	   following	   the	  classical	  approach	  of	   International	  Relations.	  This	   term	  of	  
structure	   refers	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   Piaget	   and	   is	   used	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   interplay	   between	   individuals	   and	  
society.	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processes	  into	  the	  existing	  structure	  is	  thus	  unproblematic.	  As	  a	  result,	  new	  phenomena	  will	  
be	   attributed	   to	   existing	   perception	   already	   integrated	   in	   the	   structure.	   This	   happens	  
because	   the	   similarity	  makes	   it	   easy	   to	   integrate	   items	  with	   little	   cognitive	   resistance	   into	  
one’s	  own	  cognitive	  structure.	  	  
While	   the	   term	   assimilation	   describes	   the	   internalization	   of	   objects	   and	   experiences,	  
accommodation	   refers	   to	   the	   confrontation	   of	   objects	   and	   events,	   which	   have	   no	  
counterpart	   in	   the	   cognitive	   structure.	   This	   makes	   a	   modification	   or	   reconfiguration	  
necessary.	   The	   process	   of	   accommodation	   occurs	   through	   discrepancies	   or	   defects	   in	   the	  
stringency	  of	  the	  apperception	  or	  the	  social	  action	  of	  the	  individual.	  „If	  this	  goal	  cannot	  be	  
reached,	   the	   disturbance	   can	   lead	   to	   an	   accommodation	   (...)	   to	   avoid	   unproductive	  
triggering	   in	   similar	   situations.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   this	   new	   constellation	   can	   cause	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  new	  schema	  which	  replaces	  the	  old	  one“3	   (Glasersfeld	  1994:	  33).	  When	  both	  
mechanisms	  of	   acquiring	   knowledge	   are	   categorized,	   in	   rational	   or	   common	  decisions	   the	  
mechanism	  of	   assimilation	   seems	   to	  dominate,	  while	   in	   situational	   action	  accommodation	  
increases	   (Scholl	   1992:	   109).	   The	   components	   of	   assimilation	   and	   accommodation	   are	  
determined	  by	  a	  specific	  characteristic:	  the	  principle	  of	  equilibrium.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  in	  
the	   process	   of	   acquiring	   knowledge,	   failures	   and	   defects	   occur	   in	   assimilation	   and	  
accommodation,	  which	  the	   individual	  strives	  to	  reduce,	  „because	  as	  well	   in	  the	  perception	  
as	   in	  the	  elementary	  or	  higher	  acquired	  behavior	  self-­‐regulative	  processes	  are	   integrated"4	  
(Piaget	  1992:	  176).	  An	  already	  existing	  equilibrium	  of	  the	  inner	  structure	  of	  an	  individual	  in	  
the	   absence	   of	   anomalies	   and	   irregularities	   makes	   a	   comprehensive	   adaptation	   neither	  
necessary	  nor	  even	  possible	  (Seiler	  1994:	  67).	  Accordingly,	  the	  primary	  aim	  is	  cognitive	  self-­‐
regulation,	  the	  establishment	  or	  regaining	  of	  an	  equilibrium	  that	  means	  a	  balancing	  between	  
constancy	  and	  development	  of	  one’s	  own	  cognition.	  Following	  the	  principle	  of	  equilibrium,	  
individuals	  always	  strive	  for	  congruence	  between	  their	  endogenous	  cognitive	  structure	  and	  
the	   exogenous	   environment.	   Human	   beings	   –	   because	   of	   their	   individual	   experience	   and	  
schemata	  –	  create	  an	  inner	  structure	  for	  themselves,	  which	  constantly	  has	  to	  be	  in	  balance	  
with	  the	  order	  surrounding	  them.	  A	  crucial	  factor	  therefore	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  subject	  
does	  not	  only	   intent	  pure	  accumulation	  of	   information,	  but	  beyond	  that	  tries	  to	  transform	  
information	  into	  a	  structured	  order	  (Seel	  1991:	  44).	  	  
In	  sum,	  Piaget´s	  elements	  of	  assimilation	  and	  accommodation	  convey	  the	  expectation	  that	  if	  
confronted	  with	   new	   information,	   an	   individual	  will	   first	   of	   all	   try	   to	   assimilate	   them	   into	  
their	   cognitive	   structure.	   In	   terms	   of	   scientific	   knowledge,	   decision	   makers	   will	   activate	  
schemata,	  which	  are	  congruent	  with	  that	  new	  information.	  	  
	  
Hypothesis	  2	  asserts	  that:	  If	  decision	  makers	  are	  confronted	  new	  (scientific)	  information,	  they	  
assimilate	  it	  by	  connecting	  it	  with	  existing	  schemata	  to	  minimize	  cognitive	  resistance.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
4	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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Hypothesis	   3	   asserts	   that:	   If	   new	   information	   fails	   the	   connection	  with	   existing	   schemata,	  
accommodation	  will	  occur	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  cognitive	  structure	  and	  initiate	  a	  
process	  of	  learning.	  	  	  
	  
A	  question	  that	  likely	  appears	  is	  how	  schemata	  occur	  in	  the	  context	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  
and	   how	   can	   they	   be	   measured.	   Often	   the	   argument	   is	   urged	   that	   the	   occurrence	   of	  
schemata	  can	  hardly	  be	  measured	  without	  bringing	  the	  relevant	  person	  into	  a	  laboratory	  or	  
to	  look	  into	  a	  policy	  makers	  mind	  (Hermann	  et	  al.	  1997).	  Likewise	  Kuklinski	  et	  al.	  state,	  “We	  
have	  been	  given	  no	  maps	  of	  political	  schemas”	  (1991:	  1342	  f.).	  	  	  
A	  way	   to	   avoid	   this	   dilemma	   is	   proposed	   by	  Hermann	   et	   al.	   (1997:	   410).	   They	   suggest	   to	  
define	  categories	  of	  schemata	  derived	  from	  theoretical	  expectation	  and	  to	  examine	   if	  they	  
occur	  in	  the	  rhetorical	  behaviour	  of	  relevant	  decision	  makers.	  “No	  one	  can	  observe	  cognition	  
any	  more	  than	  they	  can	  observe	  traits,	   legitimacy,	  or	  power	  for	  that	  matter.	  What	  we	  can	  
observe	  are	  the	  consequences	  our	  theory	  says	  should	  be	  produced	  if	  the	  theory	  is	  useful.	  In	  
more	   straightforward	   terms,	   we	   need	   to	   deduce	   operational	   indicators	   for	   our	   cognitive	  
concepts”	  (Hermann	  et	  al.	  1997:	  410).	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  science-­‐policy-­‐interaction,	  the	  literature	  provides	  little	  help	  on	  how	  to	  develop	  
these	   categories	   (Dunlop	   2009).	   Research	   that	   deals	   with	   the	   manifestations	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge	  by	  decision	  makers	  can	  solely	  be	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Haas	  and	  Underdal	  (Haas	  
1992a;	   1992b;	   1997;	   2004;	   Underdal	   2000).	   While	   Haas	   describes	   the	   categories	   quite	  
implicitly,	  Underdal	  treats	  them	  as	  the	  independent	  variables	  in	  his	  research	  design.	  	  	  	  
Analyzing	   the	   studies	  done	  by	  Haas	  and	  Underdal,	   I	   derived	   seven	  categories,	  which	  were	  
identified	  as	  potential	  schemata.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Problem	  awareness:	  Scientific	  knowledge	  can	  be	  used	  for	  raising	  awareness	  for	  a	  
problem.	  Decision	  makers	  using	   this	   schema	  accept	   the	  knowledge	  provided	  by	  
science	  as	  defining	  the	  causes	  and	  scope	  of	  a	  problem.	  	  
2. Agenda	   setting:	   Evidence	   and	   conclusion	   drawn	   by	   science	   shape	   the	   political	  
agenda	   of	   decision	   makers.	   Decision	   makers	   take	   up	   scientific	   knowledge	   to	  
solicit	  for	  policy	  issues.	  	  
3. Policy	  action:	  In	  search	  for	  justification,	  decision	  makers	  can	  interpret	  knowledge	  
as	   a	   reason	   for	   policy	   action.	   Scientific	   knowledge	   in	   this	   context	   is	   used	   as	  
rationalization	  and	  validation.	  	  
4. Rejection:	  Opposite	  to	  the	  three	  categories	  developed	  above	  scientific	  knowledge	  
may	   not	   only	   distil	   into	   the	   decision	   making	   process.	   The	   strongest	   negative	  
category	  is	  to	  reject	  science	  and	  declare	  its	  results	  as	  non-­‐acceptable.	  	  	  	  
5. Uncertain	   knowledge:	   Although	   a	   complete	   rejection	   is	   not	   very	   likely,	  
assimilation	  may	   lead	  to	  dismiss	  scientific	  knowledge.	  One	  possibility	   is	  that	  the	  
results	  of	  science	  are	  questioned	  because	  of	  remaining	  uncertainty.	  	  
6. Competing	   science:	   Decision	   makers	   may	   also	   rely	   on	   competing	   scientific	  
knowledge,	   which	   contradicts	   the	   current	   one.	   The	   results	   of	   these	   scientific	  
findings	   are	   more	   convenient	   with	   one´s	   own	   prior	   belief.	   But	   even	   if	   both	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scientific	  resources	  come	  to	  similar	  conclusions,	  decision	  makers	  may	  prefer	  one	  
institution	  for	  example	  because	  of	  nationality	  or	  other	  reasons.	  	  
7. Disregard:	   It	   is	   also	   conceivable	   that	   decision	  makers	   have	   such	   strong	   beliefs	  
about	   a	   policy	   that	   they	   act	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   or	   find	   it	  
negligible.	  Science	  is	  then	  disregarded.	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   mention	   that	   the	   different	   schemata	   are	   not	   meant	   to	   be	   go/no	   go	  
categories.	  Decision	  makers	  are	  expected	   to	  make	  use	  of	  different	   schemata.	   Like	   schema	  
theory	  suggests,	  schemata	  can	  be	  organized	  in	  hierarchical	  structures,	  but	  also	  other	  forms	  
of	   organization.	   Schemata	   may	   also	   interact,	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	   are	   transformed	   into	   a	  
generalized	  description	  or	  a	  conceptual	  design.	  “Similarly,	  while	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  think	  of	  
a	   single-­‐issue	   position	   as	   constituting	   a	   schema,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   conceptualize	   the	  
perspective	   a	   person	   takes	   on	   related	   issues	   as	   an	   emotionally	   laden,	   concrete	   schema	  
toward	  a	  specific	  policy	  area.	  Thus	  the	  general	  elements	  of	  a	  political	  belief	  system	  can	  be	  
thought	   of	   in	   terms	   of	   schemas	   that	   vary	   in	   their	   specificity	   and	   level	   of	   abstraction.	   The	  
structure	  of	  belief	  system	  can	  also	  be	  described	  in	  schematic	  terms”	  (Conover	  and	  Feldman	  
1984:	  98).	  	  	  	  
	  
3. Case	  selection	  	  
	  
The	  central	  thesis,	  concerning	  the	  case	  selection,	   is	  that	  schemata	  guide	  the	  interpretation	  
of	  knowledge	  provided	  by	  science.	  The	  IPCC	  and	  its	  role	  in	  climate	  change	  politics	  has	  been	  
identified	  as	  an	  ideal	  case	  for	  testing	  the	  hypothesis.	  The	  IPCC	  has	  been	  the	  central	  scientific	  
reference	  and	  delivers	   a	   stable	   consensus	  about	   the	   causes	  and	   impact	  of	   climate	   change	  
accepted	  by	  all	  relevant	  stakeholders	  (Weingart	  2001).	  	  
Climate	  change	  came	  up	  on	  the	  international	  agenda	  in	  the	  80s	  and	  evolved	  quickly	  into	  one	  
of	   the	   most	   important	   environmental	   problems	   in	   the	   recent	   decades,	   dominating	   the	  
environmental	  discourse	  (Torrance	  2006:	  29).	  From	  the	  beginning,	  science	  has	  played	  a	  vital	  
role	   in	   this	   process.	   Scientific	  warnings	   on	   a	   changing	   climate	   combined	  with	   an	   evolving	  
international	   awareness	   of	   environmental	   concerns	   starting	   in	   the	   1970s	   brought	   climate	  
change	   on	   the	   international	   agenda	   (Paterson	   1996:	   25	   f.).	   Nonetheless,	   in	   the	   beginning	  
there	   was	   a	   high	   amount	   of	   uncertainty	   concerning	   the	   questions	   about	   the	   cause	   and	  
impact	   of	   the	   problem.	   Especially	   decision	  makers	   confronted	  with	   climate	   change	   lacked	  
adequate	   information	   on	   how	   to	   address	   this	   problem	   (Beck	   2009b:	   121).	   To	   reduce	   this	  
uncertainty	   and	   to	   facilitate	   international	   political	   negotiations	   the	   WMO	   and	   the	   UNEP	  
established	  the	  IPCC	  in	  1988	  which	  was	  founded	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  central	  scientific	  authority	  to	  
(a)	   Identify	   uncertainties	   in	   the	   present	   knowledge	   (b)	   Identify	   information	   needed	   to	  
evaluate	   policy	   implications	   (c)	   Review	   current	   and	   planned	   national/international	   policies	  
related	  to	  the	  greenhouse	  gas	  issue;	  (d)	  Provide	  Scientific	  and	  environmental	  assessments	  to	  
governments	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  their	  policies	  
on	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  and	  environmental	  programs	  (Pachauri	  2004).	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The	  clear	  understanding	  of	   its	   role	  can	  be	  seen	   in	   the	   IPCC´s	   self-­‐description	  „to	  be	  policy	  
relevant	  but	  not	  policy	  prescriptive“(IPCC	  2010:	   1).	   This	   clear	  dissociation	  of	   scientific	   and	  
political	   processes	   has	   been	   a	   core	   principal	   of	   the	   IPCC	  work	   (Keller	   2010).	   Drawing	   and	  
consequently	  reformulating	  boundaries,	  it	  has	  served	  as	  the	  central	  scientific	  authority	  and	  
been	  appreciated	  by	  all	  relevant	  stakeholders.	  The	  outcomes	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  work,	  given	  in	  the	  
form	   of	   Assessment	   Reports,	   summarize	   the	   consensual	   knowledge	   about	   climate	   change	  
(Yamin	   and	   Depledge	   2004:	   466).	   The	   public	   response	   on	   the	   four	   Assessment	   Reports	  
released	  by	  the	  IPCC	  in	  1990,	  1995,	  2001	  and	  2007	  have	  shown	  its	  increasing	  significance	  for	  
the	  political	  process	  (Zillman	  2007:	  887	  ff.).	  	  
In	  sum,	  it	  can	  be	  stated	  that	  the	  IPCC	  has	  consequently	  followed	  the	  linear-­‐model	  of	  science,	  
acting	   as	   a	   boundary	   organization	   between	   politics	   and	   science	   (Poloni	   2009).	   The	   IPCC’s	  
Assessment	   reports	   –	   inside	   and	   outside	   of	   the	   scientific	   community	   –	   are	   accepted	   and	  
appreciated	  documents,	  which	  serve	  as	   focal	  points	   for	   the	  medial	  and	  political	  debate	  on	  
climate	  change	  (Dessler	  and	  Parson	  2010:	  58;	  Conrad	  2008:	  139;	  van	  der	  Sluijs	  et	  al.	  1998:	  
293;	  Torrance	  2006:	  45).	  
Due	   to	   its	   utmost	   importance	   the	   IPCC	   has	   been	   analyzed	   from	   diverse	   perspectives.	   As	  
Hulme	   states,	   no	   other	   international	   scientific	   panel	   has	   ever	   been	   so	   comprehensively	  
investigated	  with	  regards	  to	  its	  mandatory,	  process	  and	  relevance	  (2010).	  However	  little	  has	  
been	  said	  so	  far	  about	  the	  impact	  it	  had	  on	  relevant	  decision	  makers.	  	  
To	  verify	  my	  hypothesis	  I	  looked	  for	  countries	  which	  can	  be	  described	  a	  “cases	  of	  success”.	  A	  
case	   of	   success	   means	   that	   the	   respective	   government	   pursued	   policy	   action	   to	   avoid	  
climate	   change.	  Governments	  must	   have	   deployed	   for	   action	   and	   collaboration	   in	   climate	  
change	  on	   the	  national	   and	   international	   level.	   In	   these	  positive	   cases,	   I	   assume	   scientific	  
knowledge	   to	   have	   played	   a	   more	   influential	   role	   than	   in	   cases	   of	   countries	   responding	  
neutrally	  or	  negatively	  towards	  collaboration	  on	  climate	  change.	  Germany	  provides	  an	  ideal	  
case	   in	   that	   context.	   From	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	   international	   climate	  change	  negotiations,	  
starting	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  Intergovernmental	   Negotiating	   Committee	   (INC)	   in	  
1991,	  Germany	  acted	  as	  a	  pusher	  for	  ambitious	  reduction	  targets	  and	  binding	  international	  
agreements	  (Andresen	  and	  Agrawala	  2002;	  Andresen	  1998;	  Beck	  2009;	  Brühl	  2007;	  Oberthür	  
and	   Ott	   2000).	   Although	   the	   reputation	   occasionally	   had	   been	   damaged,	   the	   basic	  
orientation	   towards	   cooperation	   in	   European	   and	   in	   international	   context	   was	   constant	  
(Weidner	  and	  Mez	  2008:	  357).	  	  
The	   central	   institution	   responsible	   for	   climate	   change	   related	   issues	   in	   Germany	   is	   the	  
Bundesministerium	  für	  Umwelt,	  Naturschutz	  und	  Reaktorsicherheit	  (BMU)	  founded	  in	  1986.	  
Even	  though	  climate	  change	   is	  understood	  as	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  task	  within	  the	  cabinet,	  the	  
BMU	  is	   in	  charge	  of	  setting	  reduction	  targets	  and	  responsible	  for	  representing	  Germany	   in	  
international	   negotiations	   (Böckem	   2000:	   9).	   The	   Minister	   of	   Environment	   thus	   leads	  
international	  negotiations	  and	  works	  out	  negotiation	  positions	  (Ulbert	  1997:	  158).	  	  
In	  this	  survey	  the	  time	  frame	  was	  set	  from	  1994	  to	  2009.	  This	  period	  contains	  incumbencies	  
of	  three	  different	  Ministers	  for	  Environment:	  Angela	  Merkel	  1994-­‐1998,	  Jürgen	  Trittin	  1998-­‐
20005,	   and	  Sigmar	  Gabriel	   2005-­‐2009.	  These	   three	  Ministers	  provide	  a	   strong	   test	   for	   the	  
hypothesis	   for	   the	   following	   reasons:	   1.	   All	   ministers	   originate	   from	   different	   political	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parties.	  2.	  All	  Ministers	  were	  holding	  office	  under	  different	  political	  coalitions.	  Angela	  Merkel	  
is	  member	   of	   the	   conservative	   party	   CDU	   that	  was	   in	   a	   coalition	  with	   liberal	   FDP.	   Jürgen	  
Trittin	  stems	  from	  the	  Green	  Party,	  which	  was	  in	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  social	  democrats	  SPD.	  
Social	  democrat	  Sigmar	  Gabriel	  was	  in	  office	  under	  a	  coalition	  between	  social	  democrats	  and	  
conservatives.	   These	   different	   backgrounds	   might	   result	   in	   dissimilar	   schemata	   used	   to	  
interpret	   scientific	   knowledge.	   It	   also	   verifies	   if	   for	   all	   Minister	   scientific	   knowledge	   has	  
played	  a	  role	  for	  their	  political	  action	  towards	  climate	  change.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Minister	   Angela	  Merkel	  	  
(1994-­‐1998)	  









Social	  democrats	  –	  Green	  
Party	  	  
Conservative	  –	  social	  
democrats	  	  
	  
3.1. A	  brief	  note	  on	  methods	  	  
	  	  
For	  my	  survey	  I	  derived	  potential	  schemata	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  applied	  them	  to	  a	  case	  
study.	  Therefore	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  verify	  if	  they	  occur	  as	  schemata	  in	  the	  verbal	  behavior	  of	  
political	   decision	   makers.	   This	   way	   to	   measure	   schemata	   is	   for	   example	   suggested	   by	  
Johnston	  et	  al	  (1984:	  101f).	  	  
Traditionally	   schemata	   developed	   from	   theoretical	   considerations	   are	   tested	   through	  
questionnaires	   or	   selection	   games.	   This	   way	   of	   methodical	   work	   is	   not	   feasible	   for	   my	  
research	   question.	   Problems	   are	  mainly	   rooted	   in	   the	   research	   object	   itself.	   “It	   is	   hard	   to	  
conceive	   of	   giving	   people	   like	   Tony	   Blair,	   Saddam	   Hussein,	   or	   Boris	   Yeltsin	   a	   battery	   of	  
psychological	  tests	  or	  having	  them	  submit	  to	  a	  series	  of	  clinical	   interviews.	  Not	  only	  would	  
they	  not	  have	  time	  for,	  or	  tolerate,	  such	  procedures,	  they	  would	  be	  wary	  that	  the	  results,	  if	  
made	   public,	   might	   prove	   politically	   damaging	   to	   them”	   (Hermann	   2002:	   1).	   Beyond,	  
interviews,	  which	   are	   done	   in	   temporal	   distance	   to	   events,	  might	   bias	   the	   result	   because	  
retrospectively	  action	  is	  interpreted	  differently.	  Another	  method	  suggested	  by	  psychological	  
and	  constructivist	  research	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  verbal	  behavior	  of	  actors.	  Decision	  makers	  
use	   speech	   acts	   to	   communicate	   their	   estimate	   of	   a	   problem,	   provide	   solutions	   and	   to	  
inform	  other	  relevant	  actors.	  In	  short,	  speech	  acts	  are	  a	  way	  to	  take	  position	  in	  the	  discourse	  
about	  a	  problem	  (Klotz	  and	  Lynch	  2007:	  53).	  „In	  other	  words,	  the	  speech	  of	  leaders	  (almost	  
always)	   contains	   information	   that	   is	   indicative	   of	   their	   true	   beliefs“	   (Renshon	   2009:	   652).	  
Consequently,	   examining	   such	   materials	   provides	   a	   basis	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   general	  
intentions,	  attitudes	  and	  interpretations	  of	  an	  individual	  (Mayntz	  et	  al.	  1974:	  151).	  Content	  
analysis	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   adequate	   method	   for	   examining	   documents	   all	   considered	   as	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adequate	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   relevant	   schemata.	   In	   contrast	   to	   discourse	   analysis,	   content	  
analysis	  seeks	  to	  examine	  the	  individual’s	  construction	  of	  meaning	  (Ulbert	  2005:	  16).	  	  
For	  my	  survey	  all	  verbal	  material	  of	  the	  three	  German	  environmental	  Ministers	  from	  1994	  to	  
2009	   has	   been	   collected	   and	   analyzed.	   These	  materials	   include	   government	   declarations,	  
speeches	  at	  conferences,	  debates	  in	  the	  parliament,	  interviews	  in	  newspaper	  etc.	  	  	  
	  
4. The	  international	  German	  climate	  change	  politics	  1994	  –	  2009	  
	  
4.1. Germany,	  early	  frontrunner	  in	  environmental	  politics	  	  
	  
Although	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  environmental	  politics	  Germany	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  laggard,	  
this	   changed	  with	   the	  national	  and	   international	  development	   in	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  An	  
increased	  awareness	  of	  environmental	  concerns	  was	  triggered	  by	  several	  events;	  the	  report	  
about	  the	  “limits	  of	  growth”	  1972	  published	  by	  the	  Cub	  of	  Rome,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
regime	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  ozone	  layer	  1987,	  the	  report	  by	  the	  Brundtland	  commission	  
„Our	  common	  Future“	  1987	  and	  the	  nuclear	  disaster	  in	  Chernobyl	  1986.	  To	  put	  it	  simple,	  all	  
these	   events	   led	   to	   the	   birth	   of	   a	   national	   environmental	   policy	   supported	   by	   the	   now	  
institutionalized	  ecological	  movement	  that	  led	  to	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  green	  party	  1980.	  As	  
a	   consequence	   “ökologische	   Modernisierung”	   (ecological	   modernization)	   and	   sustainable	  
development	  became	  overall	  concepts	  of	  German	  politics	  and	  were	  guiding	  principles	  for	  all	  
successive	   governments	   (Weidner	   2008:	   11	   f.).	   Climate	   Change	  was	   identified	   as	   a	  major	  
environmental	  concern	  and	  chancellor	  Kohl	  declared	  it	  as	  the	  central	  pressing	  environmental	  
problem	  in	  March	  1987	  (Weidner	  2008:	  6).	  The	  Enquete	  Kommission	  (enquiry	  commission)	  
“precaution	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  earth”,	  which	  came	  into	  force	  1987,	  
scientifically	  approved	  this	  political	  agenda.	  In	  its	  third	  report	  published	  in	  1990,	  the	  Enquete	  
Kommission	   concluded	   that	   climate	   change	  would	   be	   a	   serious	   threat	   in	   the	   present	   and	  
future.	  A	  parliamentary	  committee	  was	  established	  to	   formulate	  strategies	   to	  avoid	  global	  
warming.	  	  
	  
4.2. Angela	  Merkel	  1994-­‐1998	  
	  
After	  his	  tight	  re-­‐election	  as	  chancellor	  in	  1994,	  Helmut	  Kohl	  rearranged	  his	  cabinet.	  Angela	  
Merkel,	   former	   Minster	   of	   Family	   and	   Youth,	   replaced	   the	   well-­‐recognized	   Minister	   of	  
Environment,	  Klaus	  Töpfer.	  Opposite	   to	   the	  brilliant	   speaker	  Töpfer,	  Merkel	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  
rational	  analyst	  who	  gave	  high	  value	  to	  technical	  and	  scientific	  input	  (Schlieben	  2009:	  440).	  	  
In	  Kohl´s	  government	  declaration	  climate	  change	  only	  played	  a	  marginal	  role	  stating	  that	  in	  
the	   face	   of	   climate	   problems	   abstaining	   from	   the	   expansion	   of	   nuclear	   power	   would	   be	  
“foolish”.5	   Merkel	   however	   declared	   the	   faltering	   climate	   politics	   as	   one	   of	   her	   central	  
concerns	  for	  her	  term	  in	  office.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Bundestag	  Plenarprotokolle	  13/5,	  1995:	  44,	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In	   January	   1995	   the	   Bundestag	   (German	   federal	   parliament)	   debated	   the	   report	   of	   the	  
Enquete	  Kommission.	  The	  report	  concluded	  that	  emission	  reductions	  are	  needed	  to	  prevent	  
climate	  change.	  Merkel	  made	  clear	   that	   the	  problem	   is	  now	  on	  the	   table	  and	  that	  science	  
has	   provided	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   the	   political	   discussion.6	   Following	   Merkel	   political	  
decision	   makers	   now	   have	   no	   excuses	   for	   denying	   collective	   action.	   Outcomes	   of	   the	  
Enquete	   report	   will	   directly	   feed	   into	   to	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Following	   the	  
recommendations	   of	   the	   report,	   Merkel	   announced	   emission	   reduction	   targets	   of	   25-­‐30	  
percent	  compared	  to	  the	  level	  of	  1987.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
On	  the	  international	  level,	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  following	  the	  Rio	  Summit	  in	  1992	  had	  
led	   to	  a	  pretty	   fast	   ratification	  of	   the	  agreed	  convention	   finalized	   in	  1994.	  Simultaneously,	  
doubt	   had	   emerged	   that	   the	   commitments	   made	   by	   the	   industrialized	   countries	   were	  
inadequate	   to	  meet	   the	  objectives	  of	   the	  convention.	  To	  agree	  on	  a	  common	  strategy	   the	  
first	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  (COP-­‐1)	  was	  held	  from	  28th	  March	  to	  7th	  April	  1995	  in	  Berlin.	  
Prior	   to	   the	   conference	   the	   INC	  had	  held	   several	  meetings	   to	  agree	  on	  a	   framework	   for	  a	  
legal	   agreement.	   The	   German	   delegation,	   together	   with	   the	   Alliance	   of	   the	   Small	   Island	  
States	  (AOSIS),	  played	  a	  progressive	  role	  in	  the	  negotiations	  by	  proposing	  a	  reduction	  target	  
of	  20	  per	  cent	  by	  2005	  compared	  to	  the	  basis-­‐level	  of	  1990	  (Paterson	  1996:	  68).	  However,	  
during	   the	   last	  meeting	   to	   the	  COP-­‐1	   in	  New	  York,	   it	  became	  clear	   that	  concrete	  numbers	  
and	  time	  periods	  would	  be	  rejected	  due	  to	  the	  diverse	   interests	  of	  the	  participants.	   In	  the	  
Bundestag	  Merkel	  outlined	  the	  governmental	  strategy	  for	  the	  COP-­‐1.	  Merkel	   took	  position	  
on	  international	  voices,	  which	  were	  critical	  about	  the	  scientific	  evidence	  on	  global	  warming.	  
“We	  can´t	  wait	  till	  all	  remaining	  uncertainties	  are	  completely	  clarified.	  As	  politicians	  we	  are	  
committed	   to	  precautionary.	  Therefore	   it	   is	   important	   to	  pursue	  measures	  against	   climate	  
change”7	  	  
In	   Berlin,	   after	   tough	   negotiations,	   it	   was	   agreed	   to	   declare	   the	   current	   convention	   as	  
inadequate	  and	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  agreement	  on	  reducing	  emissions	  for	  the	  time	  beyond	  the	  
year	  2000.	  Till	  the	  COP-­‐3	  a	  legal	  document	  should	  be	  agreed	  and	  presented	  for	  ratification.	  
Highest	   respect	  was	   paid	   to	  Merkel´s	   negotiation	   efforts.	   The	   host	   of	   the	   conference	  was	  
able	   to	   hammer	   out	   a	   compromise	   during	   the	   last	   night	   of	   the	   negotiations.	   Constantly	  
swinging	  between	  the	  opposing	  groups	  EU	  and	  the	  US,	  she	  mediated	  a	  compromise	  till	  6:30	  
in	   the	  morning,	  which	   immediately	  was	  presented	  as	   the	  Berlin	  Mandate	   (Schlieben	  2009:	  
440).	  The	  enhanced	  reputation	  for	  Germany	  was	  underlined	  by	  the	  decision	  that	  Bonn	  was	  
voted	   for	   as	   the	  permanent	  host	   of	   the	   secretariat	   for	   the	   convention,	   accompanied	  by	   a	  
technical	   as	   well	   as	   a	   scientific	   body	   (SBI	   and	   SBSTA).	   Presenting	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	  
conference	  in	  the	  Bundestag	  Merkel	  called	  the	  Berlin	  Mandate	  a	  success	  (Bulletin	  1995/33:	  
277).	   The	   IPCC	   and	   its	   chairman	   Bert	   Bolin	   had	   emphasized	   the	   need	   for	   action	   and	   the	  
inadequacy	   of	   the	   current	   agreement.	   The	   conference	   had	  managed	   to	   pave	   the	   way	   to	  
develop	   a	   new	   agreement.	   But	   given	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   IPCC,	   Merkel	   made	   clear	   that	  
stronger	  efforts	  are	  necessary	  to	  negotiate	  concrete	  emissions	  targets	  after	  the	  year	  2000.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Bundestag	  Plenarprotokolle	  13/13,	  1995:	  813.	  	  	  	  
7	  Bundestag	  Plenarprotokolle	  13/27,	  1995.	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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The	   outcomes	   of	   the	   conference	   gave	   a	   vital	  momentum	   to	   national	   climate	   politics.	   The	  
public	   announcement	   of	   the	   government	   to	   take	   control	   measures	   to	   achieve	   emission	  
targets	   led	   to	   a	   “voluntary	   self	   restriction”	   of	   the	   commercial	   associations.	   They	   self-­‐
restricted	   to	   reduce	   emissions	   20	   percent	   till	   2020	   compared	   to	   level	   of	   1990.	   Merkel	  
contemporary	  declared	  that	  the	  German	  government	  would	  meet	  the	  reduction	  target	  of	  25	  
percent	  till	  2005.	  
The	   COP-­‐2	   in	   Geneva	   8th	   till	   19th	   of	   July	   1996,	   was	   the	   next	   international	   climate	   change	  
conference.	   Climate	   change	   had	   remained	   an	   issue	   high	   on	   the	   international	   political	  
agenda.	  The	  road	  to	  Geneva	  was	   largely	   influenced	  by	  the	  Second	  IPCC	  Assessment	  report	  
released	   prior	   to	   the	   conference.	   Most	   important,	   the	   report	   stated,	   “the	   balance	   of	  
evidence	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  discernible	  human	  influence	  on	  global	  climate”	  (IPCC	  1995:	  
22).	  In	  her	  comment	  to	  the	  IPCC	  report	  Merkel	  indicated	  that	  changes	  in	  climate	  could	  now	  
be	  attributed	  to	  human	  influence.	  As	  a	  consequence	  she	  urged	  for	  immediate	  action	  against	  
climate	   change:	   “we	   can´t	   wait	   till	   serious	   repercussions	   of	   climate	   change	   come	   into	  
effect”8	   (DPA	   17.12.1995).	   All	   parties,	   including	   the	   US-­‐administration,	   adopted	   the	   IPCC	  
report.	   “The	  Geneva	  Ministerial	  Declaration	  endorsing	   the	   IPCC´s	   findings,	   although	   it	  was	  
not	   formally	   adopted	   by	   COP-­‐2,	   effectively	   silenced	   climate	   science	   skeptics,	   forcing	   the	  
political	  pace	  of	  negotiations”	  (Yamin	  and	  Depledge	  2004:	  24).	  In	  her	  open	  statement	  at	  the	  
COP-­‐2,	   Merkel,	   acting	   president	   of	   the	   conference,	   renewed	   her	   statement	   that	   recent	  
scientific	   findings	   suggest	  urgent	  action	  against	   climate	  change.	   “We	  can´t	  wait	   till	   serious	  
consequences	   –	   like	   sea-­‐level-­‐rise,	   negative	   impacts	   on	   human	   health	   (…)	   –	   are	   actually	  
occurring,	  we	  have	  to	  act	  now”9	  (FAZ	  06.07.1996).	  Further	  she	  complained	  about	  the	  current	  
wait-­‐and-­‐see-­‐politics	   that	   delayed	   concrete	   efforts	   to	   protect	   the	   climate.	   “A	   lack	   of	  
collective	  efforts	  will	  result	   in	  an	  increase	  of	  global	  temperature	  about	  3.5	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
the	   next	   century”10	   (FAZ	   06.07.1996).	   At	   the	   end	   a	  Ministerial	   Declaration	  was	   passed,	   in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   Second	   IPCC	   Assessment	   Report,	   including	   the	   demand	   for	   legally	  
binding	   targets	   and	   the	   need	   for	   technology	   transfer	   to	   developing	   countries.	   This	   non-­‐
official	  document	  should	  set	  the	  guidelines	  for	  the	  final	  meetings	  to	  the	  protocol	  in	  Kyoto	  in	  
1997.	  	  
In	   an	   article	   published	   in	   the	   newspaper	   “Die	   Welt”	   Angela	   Merkel	   took	   position	   in	   the	  
public	   and	   political	   debate	   about	   climate	   science	   and	   the	   agreement	   reached	   in	   Geneva	  
(Welt	   19.07.1996).	   Defending	   the	   result	   of	   the	   Second	   IPCC	   Report	   and	   the	   measures	  
derived	  from	  it	  by	  politics,	  Merkel	  countered	  critical	  voices	  and	  confirmed	  to	  take	  scientific	  
warning	  seriously	  declaring	  climate	  change	  as	  the	  central	  environmental	  challenge.	  	  	  
The	   road	   to	   Kyoto	   1997	   where	   final	   decision	   should	   be	   made	   was	   again	   marked	   by	   the	  
conflict	   between	   the	   US	   and	   the	   EU.	   Merkel	   showed	   general	   disappointment	   about	   the	  
negotiation	   positions	   of	   the	   other	   Annex	   I	   parties	   and	   voted	   for	   a	   substantial	   outcome	  
instead	  of	  a	   fragile	  compromise	   (BMU	  120/97).	  The	  Kyoto	  conference	  1th	  –	  12th	  December	  
1997	  was	   the	   biggest	   environmental	   conference	   after	   the	   earth	   summit	   in	   Rio	   1992	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  	  
9	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
10	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
Daniel	  Otto	  	   	   The	  costs	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  Why	  fact-­‐based	  knowledge	  does	  hardly	  serve	  as	  political	  guideline	  	  
	   14	  
about	  10,000	  participants.	  The	  scientific	  foundation	  of	  a	  potential	  climate	  change	  was	  still	  at	  
stake	   in	   the	   debate.	  Merkel,	   in	   a	   commentary	   in	   the	   German	   newspaper	   FAZ,	   took	   up	   a	  
stance	   on	   the	   cooperation	   between	   politics	   and	   science	   in	   environmental	   issues	   (FAZ	  
01.12.1997).	  First	  of	  all	  she	  made	  clear	  that	  political	  decisions	  in	  environmental	  context	  like	  
climate	   change	   have	   to	   be	   science	   based.	   The	   conclusions	   of	   the	   First	   and	   Second	   IPCC	  
Report	  are	  sufficient	  enough	  to	  conclude	  that	  current	  agreements	  are	  inadequate	  to	  prevent	  
climate	  change.	  Even	  if	  scientific	  certainty	  is	  not	  unconditionally	  guaranteed	  decision	  makers	  
are	  committed	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  current	  information.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	   Kyoto	   negotiations	   between	   the	   EU	   –	  who	   preferred	   policies	   and	  measures	   to	   achieve	  
reduction	   targets	  while	   the	  US	   favored	   flexible	  mechanisms	   like	   emission	   trading	   and	   the	  
Clean	   Development	   Mechanism	   (CDM)	   –	   and	   the	   US	   stuck	   and	   were	   in	   risk	   to	   collapse	  
(Missbach	   1999:	   228).	   The	   appearance	   of	   US	   vice	   president	   Al	   Gore	   revitalized	   the	  
conference	  and	  the	  EU	  became	  the	  moral	  upper	  hand	  over	  the	  US,	  which	  was	  applauded	  by	  
the	  environmental	  movements	  (Andresen	  and	  Agrawala	  2002:	  47).	  The	  final	  protocol	  agreed	  
upon	  the	  11th	  of	  December	  included	  a	  total	  emission	  reduction	  of	  5	  percent	  below	  1990	  in	  
the	   commitment	   period	   of	   2008-­‐2012.	   Merkel	   acknowledged	   Kyoto	   a	   milestone	   in	   the	  
history	  of	  environmental	  protection	  (BMU	  11.12.1997).	  Although	  Merkel	  admitted	  that	  the	  
protocol	   does	   not	   meet	   the	   original	   negotiation	   objective,	   it	   is	   a	   significant	   further	  
development	  of	  the	  convention.	  	  
	  
4.3. Jürgen	  Trittin	  1998-­‐2005	  
	  
The	  social-­‐green	  coalition	  agreed	  in	  1998	  under	  the	  lead	  of	  chancellor	  Schröder	  was	  the	  first	  
government	  participation	  of	  a	  green	  party	  on	  the	  federal	  level.	  It	  was	  without	  a	  doubt	  that	  
the	  Ministry	   of	   the	   Environment	   had	   to	   be	   held	   by	   a	  member	   of	   the	   green	   party.	   Jürgen	  
Trittin,	  who	  belonged	   to	   the	   radical	  wing	  of	   the	   green	  party,	  was	   inaugurated	   as	   the	   first	  
federal	  Minister	  of	  the	  Environment.	  In	  the	  coalition	  agreement	  social	  democrats	  and	  greens	  
agreed	  to	  maintain	  the	  reduction	  emission	  targets	  of	  25	  percent	  till	  2005	  compared	  to	  the	  
level	  of	  1990.	  In	  the	  government	  declaration	  climate	  change	  was	  combined	  with	  the	  nuclear	  
power	  phase-­‐out	  all	  labeled	  under	  the	  catchphrase	  of	  “ecological	  modernization”.	  	  
Immediately	  after	  Trittin	  had	  taken	  office,	  the	  COP-­‐4	  took	  place	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  from	  2th	  –	  
13th	  November	  1998.	  Main	  purpose	  was	  to	  review	  and	  set	  rules	  for	  the	  flexible	  mechanisms	  
developed	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  Fault	  lines	  of	  conflict	  ran	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Umbrella	  
group11	   -­‐	   the	   successor	   of	   the	   former	   JUSSCANNZ.	   In	   his	   speech	   in	   Buenos	   Aires,	   Trittin	  
rejected	   the	   idea	   to	   outsource	   mitigation	   efforts	   (BMU	   13.11.1998).	   Suggested	   as	  
advantageous	  by	  the	  IPCC,	  mitigation	  has	  to	  be	  accomplished	  in	  the	  respective	  country	  while	  
quantified	  measure	   should	   capture	   the	   use	   of	   flexible	  mechanism.	   Finally	   a	   core	   group	  of	  
states	   agreed	   on	   the	   “Buenos	   Aires	   Plan	   of	   Action”	   (BAPA),	   which	   contained	   about	   120	  
points,	   formulated	  to	  concretize	  the	   implementation	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  throughout	  the	  
next	   two	   years	   till	   the	   COP-­‐6	   in	   The	   Hague.	   Following	   up	   to	   the	   conference,	   Trittin	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   The	   group	   consisted	   of	   Japan,	   the	   US,	   Canada,	   Australia,	   Island,	   New	   Zeeland,	   Norway,	   Russia	   and	   the	  
Ukraine.	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commented	  that	  the	  outcomes	  fulfilled	  the	  low	  expectations	  raised	  by	  contrasting	  national	  
positions	  of	  the	  participants	  (BMU	  61/1998).	  	  	  
On	   the	   national	   level	   the	   red-­‐green	   coalition	   agreed	   on	   a	   “Ökologische	   Steuerreform”	  
(ecological	  tax	  reformation)	  to	  sanction	  environmentally	  harmful	  behavior	  and	  to	  attract	  the	  
use	   of	   environmental	   attractive	   technology.	   Trittin	   called	   the	   reform	   the	   core	   aim	   of	   the	  
governmental	  climate	  change	  politics	  (BMU	  209/99).	  	  
After	  the	  COP-­‐1	  in	  Berlin,	  the	  COP-­‐5	  in	  Bonn	  25th	  October	  –	  5th	  of	  November	  1999	  was	  the	  
second	   COP	   conference	   in	   Germany.	   The	   aftermath	   of	   the	   COP-­‐4	   had	   led	   to	   modest	  
aspirations	  for	  progress	  concerning	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  Trittin	  instead	  
called	  for	  significant	  progress	  to	  allow	  the	  protocol	  to	  come	  into	  force	  in	  2002	  at	  the	  latest	  
(BMU	  190/99).	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  conference	  chancellor	  Schröder	  announced	  to	  initiate	  
an	   ambitious	   national	   climate	   change	   program.	   The	   conference	   in	   Bonn	   brought	   few	  
impulses	   for	   further	   international	  progress	   (Lindenthal	  2009:	  201).	   In	  his	   statement	  at	   the	  
German	  parliament	  Trittin	  merely	  called	  the	  conference	  in	  Bonn	  an	  "important	  station	  to	  the	  
regularization	  of	  the	  open	  questions	  of	  the	  protocol“(BMU	  192/99).	  	  
In	   November	   2000	   the	   German	   economy	   had	   again	   announced	   to	   self-­‐commit	   to	   reduce	  
emissions	   35	   percent	   till	   2012.	   In	   return	   the	   government	   waived	   restriction	   to	   avoid	  
competitive	   disadvantages.	   On	   the	   18th	   of	   November	   the	   Bundestag,	   as	   announced	   by	  
Gerhard	   Schröder	   at	   the	   COP-­‐5,	   ratified	   a	   program	   stipulating	   the	   use	   of	   renewable	  
technologies	  and	  energy	  efficiency.	  	  
The	  COP-­‐6	  in	  The	  Hague	  13th	  –	  25th	  November	  2000	  should	  have	  been	  the	  final	  stage	  to	  the	  
protocol,	  but	  ended	  in	  a	  collapse	  casting	  doubt	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  protocol.	  The	  main	  goal	  
of	  Germany	  and	  the	  EU	  had	  been	  to	  start	  the	  ratification	  to	  put	  the	  protocol	   into	  force	  till	  
2002.	   Trittin	   had	   referred	   that	   „The	   recent	   report	   by	   the	   IPCC	   prognoses	   an	   increase	   of	  
temperature	   between	   1.5	   –	   6	   degree	   if	   no	   effective	   measures	   are	   pursued”	   (BMU	  
22.11.2000).	   While	   the	   EU	   considered	   reduction	   measures	   through	   domestic	   action	   as	  
essential,	  the	  US	  opted	  for	  flexible	  mechanisms	  like	  sinks	  outside	  domestic	  range.	  The	  IPCC	  
had	  produced	  a	  special	  report	  on	  the	  role	  of	  sinks	  in	  climate	  change,	  which	  was	  released	  in	  
2000.	   Beyond	   that,	   the	   preliminary	   conclusions	   of	   the	   Third	   IPCC	  Report	  were	   circulating.	  
Trittin	  in	  a	  government	  declaration	  prior	  to	  the	  conference	  approved	  of	  the	  report	  and	  the	  
conclusions	  drawn	  by	  the	  IPCC	  (BMU	  09.11.2000).	  However	  for	  Trittin,	  science	  advises	  that	  
Kyoto	  was	  just	  a	  first	  step	  to	  reduce	  emissions.	  During	  the	  negotiations	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  
tough	  bargaining	  would	  be	  needed	  to	   reach	  a	  compromise.	  The	  EU	  refused	  a	  compromise	  
presented	  by	  John	  Prescott,	  vice	  prime	  minister	  of	  Great	  Britain.	  While	  attempts	  by	  host	  and	  
Minster	  of	  Environment	   Jan	  Pronk	   to	  mediate	   failed,	  negotiations	  had	   to	  be	   suspended	   in	  
the	  spring	  of	  2001	  (Grubb	  and	  Yamin	  2001).	  	  	  
Germany	  was	   again	   chosen	   to	   host	   the	   COP-­‐6	   II	   in	   Bonn	  where	   the	   aborted	   negotiations	  
should	  be	  continued.	  Meanwhile	  new	  elected	  US-­‐president	  George	  Bush	  had	  announced	  to	  
withdraw	   from	   the	   Kyoto-­‐process,	   among	   other	   things	   casting	   doubt	   on	   the	   scientific	  
evidence	   about	   climate	   change.	   In	   Bonn,	   the	  US-­‐delegation	   participated	  with	   an	   observer	  
status	   and	   announced	   not	   to	   disturb	   further	   ratification	   of	   the	   protocol	   (Ott	   2001:	  475).	  
Simultaneously	  at	  the	  G8-­‐summit	  in	  Genoa	  Schröder	  tried	  to	  mediate	  between	  the	  different	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parties.	  Trittin,	  in	  an	  interview,	  explained	  not	  to	  backdrop	  beyond	  the	  current	  status	  quo	  and	  
to	  start	  ratification	  even	  without	  the	  US	  (Spiegel	  16.07.2001).	  Finally	  the	  "Bonn	  Agreement”,	  
applauded	   by	   the	   180	   Ministers	   and	   observers	   of	   the	   conference,	   helped	   to	   create	   the	  
precondition	  for	  the	  ratification	  process	  and	  to	  revive	  negotiations	  collapsed	  in	  The	  Hague.	  	  
Matters	   of	   detail	   had	   to	   be	   discussed	   at	   the	   COP-­‐7	   in	   Marrakesh	   29th	   October	   –	   10th	  
November	  2001.	  But	  contrary	  Canada,	  Russia	  and	  Japan	  opened	  up	  already	  closed	  issues	  for	  
a	   renegotiation.	   Trittin	   among	  others	   insisted	   to	  maintain	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   agreements	  
made	   in	   Kyoto	   and	   Bonn	   (BMU-­‐217/01,	   2001).	   The	   finalized	   “Marrakesh	   Accord”	   was	   a	  
package	  containing	  15	  decisions	  about	  the	  framework	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  protocol.	  	  
In	   the	   beginning	   of	   2002,	   the	  German	   parliament	   ratified	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol.	   Trittin,	   in	   a	  
government	  declaration,	  made	  clear	  that	  climate	  change	  was	  already	  reality	  and	  efforts	  like	  
the	  protocol	  might	  only	  lower	  its	  impacts	  (BMU	  20.03.2002).	  Furthermore	  Trittin	  reinforced	  
the	  leading	  role	  of	  Germany	  in	   international	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  benefits	  yielding	  from	  
these	  efforts.	  In	  autumn	  2002	  the	  red-­‐green	  coalition	  had	  been	  re-­‐elected	  for	  a	  second	  term	  
in	  office.	  The	  election	  victory	  had	  been	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐participation	  in	  the	  war	   in	   Iraq	  and	  
the	  Elbe	  flood	  in	  East	  Germany	  (Woyke	  2002).	  Schröder	  in	  a	  government	  declaration	  let	  not	  
doubt	   that	   the	   extreme	   weather	   disasters	   are	   in	   a	   direct	   connection	   to	   the	   worldwide	  
climate	  change	  (Bulletin	  Nr.	  69-­‐1,	  2002).	   In	  the	  renewed	  cabinet	  ministerial	  responsibilities	  
were	   rearranged.	   Renewable	   energies	   were	   shifted	   form	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Economy	   to	   the	  
Ministry	  of	  Environment.	  The	  coalition	  agreement	  contained	  reduction	  target	  of	  40	  percent	  
till	  2020,	  but	  only	  if	  the	  EU	  self-­‐committed	  to	  a	  30	  percent	  reduction	  target.	  	  	  	  
At	  the	  COP-­‐8	  in	  New	  Delhi	  23th	  October	  –	  1th	  November	  2002	  no	  further	  progress	  could	  be	  
reached.	  Trittin	   in	  the	  forefront	  to	  the	  COP-­‐9	   in	  Milano	  1th	  –	  23th	  December	  2003	  solicited	  
support	   for	   further	   steps	   stressing	   the	   immediate	   danger	   of	   an	   increasing	   global	  
temperature	   as	   stated	   by	   the	   IPCC	   (BMU	   4	   –	   12.12.2003).	   Till	   the	   COP-­‐9	  more	   than	   100	  
countries	  had	  ratified	  the	  protocol.	  Russia	  finally	  signed	  the	  protocol	  in	  November	  2004	  and	  
made	   the	  way	   free	   to	  get	   it	   into	   force.	   Trittin	  appreciated	  Russia´s	   ratification	  underlining	  
the	  tremendous	  costs	  of	  non-­‐action	  and	  increasing	  of	  natural	  disasters	  (BMU	  03.11.2004).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
At	   the	   COP-­‐10	   in	   Buenos	   Aires	   6th	   –	   17th	   December	   2004	   the	   Buenos	   Aires	   Program	   on	  
Adaptation	   and	   Response	   Measures	   was	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   informal	   exchange.	  
Negotiations	  we	  overshadowed	  by	  efforts	  from	  the	  US-­‐delegation	  to	  downplay	  the	  threat	  of	  
climate	  change	  and	  to	  slow	  down	  negotiations	  (Lindenthal	  2009:	  235).	  Contrary	  Trittin,	  on	  a	  
side	  event,	  warned	  about	  the	  massive	  consequences	  of	  global	  warming	  which,	  as	  announced	  
by	  science,	  is	  leading	  to	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  of	  natural	  disasters	  (BMU	  14.12.2004).	  Germany	  
and	   the	   EU	   announced	   to	  maintain	   the	   2-­‐degree	   target.	   At	   a	   follow-­‐up	  workshop	   in	  May	  
2005	  outlines	  of	  a	  Post-­‐Kyoto-­‐Process	  were	  discussed,	  Trittin	  renewed	  his	  argument	  stating	  
the	  “increased	  certainty	  of	  catastrophic	  and	  irreversible	  damages”12	  if	  the	  2	  degree	  target	  is	  
not	  achieved	  (BMU	  16.05.2005).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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4.4. Sigmar	  Gabriel	  2005-­‐2009	  	  
	  
After	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	   social-­‐green	  coalition	   in	  August	  2005,	  early	  elections	  were	   taking	  
place	  in	  September	  2005.	  The	  lack	  of	  clear	  majorities	  for	  traditional	  coalitions	  led	  to	  a	  great	  
coalition	   between	   social	   democrats	   and	   conservatives.	   New	   Chancellor	   was	   the	   former	  
Minister	   of	   Environment,	   Angela	   Merkel.	   Social	   democrat	   Sigmar	   Gabriel,	   a	   regional	  
politician,	   was	   nominated	   as	   the	   new	   Minister	   of	   Environment.	   First	   classified	   as	  
inexperienced,	  Gabriel	  soon	  acquired	  a	  reputation	  and	  worked	  target-­‐aimed	  for	  a	  strategic	  
and	  inter-­‐agency	  environmental	  policy	  (Jänicke	  2010:	  491).	  	  
In	  the	  coalition	  agreement,	  climate	  change	  was	  made	  the	  top-­‐priority	  environmental	  topic.	  
While	   the	   EU	   had	   established	   a	   30	   percent	   reduction	   target	   with	   basic	   level	   of	   1990,	  
Germany	   aimed	   to	   go	   even	   further.	   Although	   the	   Deutsche-­‐Industrie	   und	  
Handelskammertag	   (DIHK)13	   expressed	   great	   concerns	   about	   the	   costs	   of	   Germany´s	  
international	   leading	   role,	   climate	   change	   politics	   were	   mainly	   built	   on	   guidelines	   of	   the	  
former	  red-­‐green	  coalition	  (Jänicke	  2010:	  489).	  	  
Immediately	  after	  Gabriel’s	  inauguration	  the	  COP-­‐11	  took	  place	  in	  Montreal	  28th	  November	  
–	  9th	  December	  2005.	  Gabriel	  supported	  the	  EU´s	  proposal	  to	  initiate	  a	  debate	  about	  a	  Post-­‐
Kyoto	   in	   particular	   considering	   the	   north-­‐south	   compensation	   (BMU	   07.12.2005).	   The	  
conference	  was	  assessed	  as	  a	  success,	  able	  to	  close	  remaining	  questions	  and	  to	  deliberate	  
about	   a	   future	  protocol	   (Schroeder	   2010:	   34).	   To	  maintain	   dialog	   a	   number	  of	  workshops	  
were	  held	  under	  the	  UNFCCC	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  COP-­‐13	  in	  Bali	  in	  2007.	  In	  his	  opening	  speech	  to	  
the	  workshop	   in	   Bonn	   in	  May	   2006,	  Gabriel	   called	   for	   an	   ambitious	  modernization	   of	   the	  
energy	  sector	  in	  industrialized	  and	  developing	  countries.	  	  
The	   COP-­‐12	   in	   Nairobi	   6th	   –	   17th	   November	   2006	   was	   covered	   by	   the	   topic	   of	   future	  
commitments	  in	  a	  Post-­‐Kyoto.	  Al	  Gore´s	  movie	  “An	  inconvenient	  truth”	  and	  the	  report	  „The	  
Economics	   of	   Climate	   Change”	   by	   Sir	   Nicholas	   Stern	   (Stern	   2007)	   who	   criticized	   the	  
tremendous	  costs	  of	  non-­‐action	  against	  climate	  change	  had	  created	  a	  favorable	  atmosphere	  
for	   constructive	   compromises.	   In	   his	   talking	  Gabriel	   ascertained	   the	   clearness	   of	   scientific	  
evidence	  (BMU	  295/06,	  2006).	  This	  evidence	  sets	  pressure	  for	  a	  concrete	  proposal	  for	  a	  post	  
2012	  period	  considering	  the	  2degree	  target.	  However	  prior	  to	  the	  conference	  it	  had	  become	  
clear,	   that	   most	   of	   the	   Annex	   I	   Parties	   failed	   to	   reach	   their	   Kyoto-­‐commitments.	   While	  
conference	  kept	  the	  Post-­‐Kyoto	  process	  active,	  it	  failed	  to	  produce	  substantial	  results	  (Sterk	  
et	  al.	  2007:	  147).	  Concrete	  steps	  and	  measures	  were	  shifted	  onto	  future	  conferences.	  	  
During	   2007	   the	   eagerly	   awaited	   Fourth	   IPPC	   Report	   was	   published.	   More	   strongly	   than	  
ever,	  the	  Report	  underlined	  the	  human	  influence	  on	  climate	  change	  (IPCC	  2007).	  In	  October	  
2007,	  not	  without	  criticism,	  the	   IPCC	  and	  Al	  Gore	  were	  awarded	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  for	  
their	  commitment	  against	  climate	  change.	  This	  scientific	  input	  combined	  with	  the	  economic	  
input	  by	  the	  Stern	  report	  in	  2006	  gave	  climate	  change	  increased	  attention	  and	  urgency	  that	  
opened	   up	   a	   window	   of	   opportunity	   for	   the	   COP-­‐13	   3th	   –	   14th	   December	   2007	   in	   Bali	  
(Schroeder	   2010:	   35).	   In	   July	   2007	   the	  G8-­‐summit	   in	  Heiligendamm	  had	   agreed	  on	   a	   final	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document,	   which	   indicated	   to	   commonly	   act	   against	   climate	   change	   and	   to	   stabilize	  
emissions	  in	  consideration	  of	  the	  different	  capacities	  and	  responsibilities	  (Carrapatoso	  2008:	  
2).	  Chancellor	  Merkel,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  pusher	  for	  this	  agreement,	  said	  in	  an	  interview	  right	  
before	  the	  summit	  to	  expect	  a	  tough	  struggle	  for	  an	  agreement,	  but	  „you	  can	  assume	  that	  I	  
will	   not	   allow	   secured	   scientific	   expertise	   like	   the	   IPCCs	   report	   to	   be	   watered	  
down“(Bundesregierung	   04.06.2007).14	   Germany´s	   credibility	   in	   the	   negotiations	   was	  
supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   its’	   Kyoto	   commitments	   of	   21	   percent	   till	   2012	   were	   already	  
surpassed	  in	  2007	  (BMU	  278/08,	  2008)	  	  
In	  Bali,	  expectation	  by	  experts	  and	  environmental	  groups	  were	  high,	   to	  now	   finally	  decide	  
how	   to	   proceed	   with	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol.	   However,	   the	   different	   standpoints	   of	   EU,	  
developing	   countries	   and	   the	   US	   were	   still	   very	   rigid.	   (Lindenthal	   2009:	   247).	   The	   EU,	   to	  
underline	  trustworthiness,	  announced	  to	  cut	  its	  emission	  by	  30	  percent	  if	  other	  states	  would	  
set	   similar	   targets	   or	   at	   least	   20	   per	   cent	   regardless	   of	   what	   others	   parties	   do.	   Gabriel	  
additionally	   announced	   to	   invest	   another	   120	   million	   euros	   in	   technology	   transfers	   and	  
adaptation	  measures	  in	  developing	  countries.	  He	  demanded	  the	  parties	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  cut	  of	  
emission	   by	   30	   percent	   till	   2020,	   which	   are,	   as	   posed	   by	   the	   IPCC,	   only	   steps	   to	   the	  
worldwide	   reduction	  of	  emissions	  by	  50	  percent	   till	   2050	   (BMU	  12.12.2007).	  Bush	  and	  his	  
negotiation	  delegation	  –	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  next	  presidential	  elections	  –	  soon	  made	  clear	  that	  
there	   wasn´t	   an	   earthly	   chance	   that	   the	   US-­‐administration	   would	   agree	   on	   any	   binding	  
commitments.	  Under	  these	  harsh	  conditions	  long	  and	  difficult	  negotiations	  were	  necessary	  
to	  agree	  on	  a	  “Bali	  Action	  Plan”	  (BAP).	  At	  the	  COP-­‐15	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  2009	  a	  framework	  for	  
a	  Post-­‐Kyoto	   should	  be	  presented.	  Beyond	   that	   the	  conclusions	  of	   the	  Fourth	   IPCC	  Report	  
were	   formally	   recognized	   but	   only	   mentioned	   in	   a	   footnote,	   heavily	   criticized	   by	   most	  
observers	   (Carrapatoso	   2008:	   5).	   Gabriel,	   in	   the	   German	   Bundestag,	   referred	   to	   Bali	   as	   a	  
success	  because	  it	  sets	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  negotiations	  marathon	  till	  2009	  (BMU	  17.01.2008).	  
Following	  Gabriel	  diverging	  interests	  have	  to	  be	  overcome	  and	  finally	  bundled	  to	  a	  decision	  
of	   the	  central	  question	   if	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  combine	  effective	  protection	  of	   the	  climate	  with	  
successful	  economic	  cooperation.	  	  
The	  last	  consultation	  before	  the	  meeting	  in	  Copenhagen	  was	  the	  COP-­‐14	  held	  from	  1th	  –	  12th	  
December	  2008	  in	  Poznan.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  core	  decisions	  would	  take	  place	  at	  the	  COP-­‐
15,	  Poznan	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  interim	  stage.	  Recent	  political	  and	  economic	  developments	  had	  
casted	  shadows	  on	  the	  negotiations	   in	  Poznan.	  The	  approaching	  financial	  crisis	  had	  shifted	  
away	   responsiveness	   of	   governments	   for	   environmental	   concerns.	   Parallel	   to	   the	   Poznan	  
conference	   the	   EU	   had	   agreed	   on	   an	   emission	   limit	   for	   cars	   starting	   in	   2015.	   Germany,	  
pressed	  hard	  by	  its	  car	  industry,	  succeeded	  in	  softening	  restrictions,	  heavily	  criticized	  by	  the	  
other	   EU	   members	   (Guardian	   12.12.2008).15	   Gabriel	   countered	   these	   changes	   “are	   not	  
dramatic	  for	  the	  world	  climate”	  and	  that	  Germany	  had	  overfullfilled	  its	  Kyoto	  commitments	  
(Spiegel	   02.12.2008).16	   All	   these	   events	   led	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   significant	   outcomes	   in	   Poznan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
15	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/12/greenpolitics-­‐poznan	  
16	   http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/co2-­‐ausstoss-­‐von-­‐neuwagen-­‐eu-­‐kommt-­‐autoindustrie	   entgegen-­‐
a-­‐593890.html	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Waiting	   for	   the	   new	   US-­‐administration,	   most	   countries	   were	   reluctant	   to	   disclose	   their	  
negotiation	  position.	  In	  his	  speech	  at	  the	  high	  level	  segment	  in	  Poznan,	  Gabriel	  underlined	  to	  
draw	   attention	   back	   to	   climate	   change,	   stop	   detailed	   discussions	   and	   offensively	   accept	  
IPCCs	  findings	  (BMU	  11.12.008).	  Again	  concrete	  numbers	  for	  the	  cut	  of	  emissions	  failed	  and	  
still	  the	  IPCCs	  findings	  remained	  banned	  in	  a	  footnote.	  	  
In	  the	  beginning	  of	  2009	  the	  new	  Obama	  administration	  sent	  out	  optimistic	  signals	  toward	  a	  
more	   constructive	   negotiations	   position.	   On	   a	   regional	   conference	   for	   climate	   change	  
adaptation,	   Gabriel	   welcomed	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   US	   position,	   their	   acceptance	   of	   scientific	  
evidence	   and	   the	   prospect	   for	   an	   agreement	   in	   Copenhagen	   (BMU	   18.05.2009).	   On	   the	  
World	  Climate	  Conference	  in	  September	  2009,	  UN-­‐general	  secretary	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon	  called	  on	  
the	   international	   community	   to	   produce	   substantial	   progress	   towards	   an	   agreement	   in	  
Copenhagen.	  Although	  about	  100	  heads	  of	  governments	  attended	  the	  conference,	  it	  ended	  
without	   making	   any	   concrete	   offer.	   Environmental	   groups	   were	   particularly	   disappointed	  
about	  Obama´s	  performance,	  especially	  his	  vagueness	  on	  concrete	  emissions	  targets.	  Most	  
heads	   of	   government,	   including	  Merkel	   and	   Gabriel,	   expressed	   their	   disappointment	   and	  
demanded	  concrete	  steps	  for	  climate	  change	  protection	  (Stern	  23.09.2009).17	  	  
On	   the	   27th	   September	   parliamentary	   elections	   were	   held	   in	   Germany,	   which	   led	   to	   the	  
confirmation	   of	   Angela	   Merkel	   under	   a	   liberal-­‐conservative	   coalition.	   Former	   First	  
Parliamentary	  Director	  of	  the	  CDU	  Norbert	  Röttgen	  became	  the	  new	  Mister	  of	  Environment.	  	  
	  
5. The	  role	  of	  schemata	  for	  the	  perception	  of	  IPCC´s	  knowledge	  	  	  
	  
For	   my	   survey,	   Germany	   was	   chosen	   as	   a	   case	   of	   success.	   This	   case	   selection	   made	   an	  
increased	   attention	   of	   decision	   makers	   for	   IPCC´s	   knowledge	   very	   certain.	   The	   use	   of	  
scientific	   knowledge	   can	   be	   observed	   in	   the	   rhetorical	   behavior	   of	   all	   three	   Ministers	   of	  
Environment.	  However,	  differences	  occurred	  which	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
related	  schemata.	  	  
Angela	  Merkel	  received	  a	  degree	  in	  physics	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Leipzig	  and	  a	  Ph.D.	  from	  
the	   Central	   Institute	   for	   Physical	   Chemistry,	   Academy	   of	   Sciences,	   in	   Berlin.	   This	   scientific	  
background	  consequently	  has	   influenced	  her	  attitude	   towards	   scientific	   knowledge	  and	   its	  
role	  in	  the	  policy	  process.	  	  
Early	  in	  her	  term	  in	  office	  Merkel	  made	  clear	  “that	  the	  global	  dimension	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  
put	  on	  the	  table.	  Science’	  debt	  to	  be	  delivered	  to	  the	  creditor	  was	  pursued.	  There	  is	  no	  alibi	  
for	  politics	  anymore”.18	  This	  schema	  of	  Agenda	  setting,	  which	  can	  similarly	  be	  found	  in	  other	  
documents,	   illuminates	  Merkel´s	  attitude	  towards	  science-­‐policy	   interaction.	  While	  science	  
delivers	   relevant	   information,	   decision	  maker	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   that	   information.	   This	   was	  
again	   stressed	   in	   her	   newspaper	   article	   published	   prior	   to	   the	   Kyoto	   conference	   (FAZ	  
01.12.1997).	   Merkel	   defended	   climate	   science	   against	   critical	   voices	   raising	   doubt	   about	  
scientific	   evidence.	   Taking	   a	   tough	   stance	   against	   deniers,	  Merkel	   did	   not	  want	   politics	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  http://www.stern.de/wissen/technik/un-­‐klimagipfel-­‐viele-­‐murren-­‐doch-­‐ban-­‐ki-­‐moon-­‐ist-­‐erfreut-­‐
1510498.html	  
18	  Bundetag	  Plenarprotokolle	  13/13,	  1995:	  813.	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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stand	  on	  the	  sidelines	  of	  the	  debate.	  Available	  knowledge	  has	  to	  be	  used	  for	  policy	  action	  in	  
reference	   to	   the	   precautionary	   principle.	   This	   schema	   to	   take	   scientific	   knowledge	   as	   a	  
justification	   for	   policy	   action	   can	   also	   be	   observed	   in	   Kyoto.	   Disappointed	   about	   the	   US	  
position	   on	   emission	   reduction	  Merkel	   countered,	   “the	   scientific	   evidence	   underlines	   that	  
urgent	   and	   comprehensive	   action	   is	   needed”19	   (BMU	   13.07.1998).	   Science	   has	   to	   build	  
consensus	  in	  isolation	  while	  politics	  has	  to	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  influence	  scientific	  work	  
and	   outcomes.	   Beside	   the	   IPCC´s	   knowledge	   Merkel	   also	   relied	   on	   the	   expertise	   of	   the	  
Enquete	  Kommission	  and	  the	  Wissenschaftliche	  Beirat	  für	  Globale	  Umweltveränderungen20	  
that	  drew	  similar	  conclusions.	  Merkel	  made	  scientific	  validation	  a	  precondition	  to	  estimate	  if	  
a	   policy	   was	   going	   to	   be	   pursued.	   Concerning	   the	   role	   of	   sinks	   as	   a	   source	   for	   emission	  
reduction	  her	  undersecretary	  stated,	  “decisions	  can	  only	  be	  made	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  knowledge	  
from	  internationally	  recognized	  scientists”21	  (BMU	  26.06.1998).	  In	  sum,	  the	  schemata	  mostly	  
used	   by	   Merkel	   concerning	   IPCC´s	   knowledge	   refer	   to	   Agenda	   setting	   and	   policy	   action.	  
Interestingly	  her	  belief	  about	  the	  role	  of	  science	  in	  politics	  follows	  guidelines	  similar	  to	  the	  
linear	  model	   of	   science:	  While	   science	   has	   to	   build	   a	   consensus	   unaffected	   from	   political	  
influence,	  decision	  makers	  have	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  information	  provided	  by	  science	  (Merkel	  
01.12.1997).	  	  	  	  
Jürgen	  Trittin´s	  political	  vita	  differs	  widely	  from	  that	  of	  Merkel.	  Politically	  socialized	  with	  the	  
birth	  of	  the	  green	  movement	  in	  Germany,	  Trittin	  belongs	  to	  the	  radical	  left	  wing	  of	  the	  green	  
party.	  Highly	  contentious	  in	  the	  cabinet	  Trittin	  managed	  Germany’s	  nuclear	  phrase	  and	  the	  
ecological	   tax	   reform.	   Throughout	   both	   terms	   in	   office	   he	   was	   facing	   disputes	   with	   the	  
economic	  interests	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  government.	  	  	  
In	  the	  debate	  about	  climate	  change,	  Trittin	  soon	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  IPCC´s	  knowledge	  leads	  
to	  the	  conclusion	  of	  policy	  action.	  The	  schema	  policy	  action	  can	  be	  observed	  as	  dominant.	  
Particularly	   in	   international	   negotiations	   this	   schema	   was	   used	   to	   call	   for	   cooperation.	  
Different	   from	  Merkel,	   Trittin	   used	   the	   IPCC	   reports	   to	   hint	   for	   or	   against	   concrete	   policy	  
measures.	  At	  his	   first	   appearance	  at	   the	  COP-­‐5	  he	   referred	   to	   the	  Second	   IPCC	  Report	   for	  
cost	  efficient	  measures	  (BMU	  13.11.1998).	  At	  the	  COP-­‐6	  he	  said,	  “Against	  the	  background	  of	  
scientific	  findings,	  nobody	  is	  supposed	  to	  talk	  his	  way	  out	  pointing	  to	  scientific	  uncertainties.	  
To	  fulfill	  responsibilities	  we	  have	  to	  act	  today.	  The	  Kyoto	  protocol	  will	  set	  the	  framework”22	  
(BMU	  05.11.1999).	  	  	  	  	  
Another	   schema	   that	   was	   dominant	   in	   Trittin´s	   statements	   is	   problem	   awareness.	   While	  
Merkel	   referred	   to	   the	   IPCC	   as	   providing	   the	   knowledgebase	   for	  policy	   action,	   Trittin	   put	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  climate	  change.	  “Again	  we	  were	  alarmed	  by	  reports	  about	  
floods,	   landslide	   and	   natural	   disasters.	   (…)	   The	   new	   IPCC	   Report	   leaves	   no	   doubt:	   An	  
increasing	   global	   warming	   can	   be	   assumed”23	   (BMU	   09.11.2000).	   All	   too	   frequent	   Trittin	  
used	   examples	   of	   extreme	  weather	   events	   that	   were	   obviously	   forecasted	   by	   science	   for	  
problem	  awareness	  and	  requests	  for	  political	  action.	  As	  an	  example	  at	  the	  COP-­‐5	  he	  pointed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
20	  Scientific	  counsel	  for	  global	  environmental	  change	  21	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
22	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  	  
23	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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to	  hurricane	  Mitch	  and	  Floyd	  as	  examples	  for	  climate	  change	  “Do	  you	  know	  Mitch?	  Do	  you	  
know	   Floyd?”24	   (BMU	   02.11.1999).	   In	   an	   official	   governmental	   declaration	   Trittin	   had	   to	  
confess	   that	   direct	   connections	   between	   extreme	   weather	   events	   and	   climate	   change	  
cannot	  be	  completely	  clarified	  (BMU	  15.08.2002).	  However,	  he	  left	  no	  doubt	  to	  further	  push	  
for	  strong	   international	  agreements.	  Trittin	  also	  used	  scientific	  knowledge	  as	  a	   justification	  
for	   policy	   action	   against	   climate	   change.	   Nationally,	   the	   ecological	   fiscal	   reform	   and	   the	  
renewal	   energy	   law	   were	   justified	   by	   the	   danger	   and	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change.	   On	   the	  
international	   level	   scientific	   findings	   underlined	   the	   need	   for	   emission	   reductions	   and	  
political	  action	   (BMU	  09.11.2000,	  BMU	  01.11.2002,	  BMU	  02.12.2004).	   In	  his	   speech	  at	   the	  
Bundestag	   to	   ratify	   the	   Kyoto-­‐protocol	   he	   said,	   “Few	   days	   ago	   an	   ice	   floes	   as	   big	   as	   the	  
Saarland	  sheared	  off	  in	  thousand	  pieces.	  Scientists	  fear	  that	  this	  event	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  
climate	  change”25	  (BMU	  22.03.2002).	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  Trittin´s	  perception	  of	  IPCC´s	  knowledge	  shows	  that	  the	  schemata	  of	  problem	  
awareness	  and	  policy	  action	  are	  dominant.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  natural	  scientist	  Merkel,	  Trittin	  
was	   a	  member	   of	   the	   ecological	  movement	   and	   showed	   strong	   personal	   commitment	   to	  
environmental	   concerns.	   Instead	   of	   rational	   arguments,	   Trittin	   exposed	   the	   dramatic	  
consequences	  –	  sometimes	  generously	  interpreted	  –	  for	  nature	  and	  mankind	  forecasted	  by	  
the	  IPCC.	  	  	  
Sigmar	   Gabriel	   was	   a	   regional	   politician	   who	   had	   pursued	   a	   classical	   bottom-­‐up	   political	  
career.	  His	  political	  advancement	  leads	  him,	  quite	  surprisingly,	  to	  be	  called	  for	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Environment.	   Sigmar	  Gabriel´s	   climate	   change	  policy	  was	   guided	  by	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  
„Ökologische	  Industriepolitik“(ecological	  industrial	  politics),	  which	  was	  a	  semantic	  distinction	  
from	   the	   ecological	   modernization	   used	   by	   the	   former	   red-­‐green	   coalition.	   Ökologische	  
Industriepolitik	   was	   supposed	   to	   give	   prominence	   to	   the	   economic	   benefits	   of	   climate	  
change.	  	  Environmental	  protection	  was	  labeled	  as	  a	  source	  for	  economic	  success.	  Therefore	  
Gabriel	   connected	   the	   IPCC´s	   findings	   with	   the	   economic	   input	   by	   the	   Stern	   Report.	   In	  
Gabriel´s	   rhetorical	   behavior,	   the	   schema	   problem	   awareness	   is	   quite	   dominant.	   In	   his	  
speech	   at	   the	   UNFCCC-­‐dialog	   he	   said:	   “The	   need	   for	   success	   and	   the	   urgency	   of	   climate	  
protection	  measures	  are	  shown	  by	  the	  current	  scientific	  investigation	  of	  an	  already	  existing	  
change	  in	  climate.	  The	  Fourth	  IPCC	  Report	  will	  be	  able	  to	  indicate	  that.	  Forecasts	  of	  an	  on-­‐
going	   growth	   of	   emissions	   will	   counteract	   economic	   success”26	   (BMU	   15.05.2006).	   The	  
competitiveness	  of	  the	  German	  economy	  should	  be	  secured:	  “We	  (...)	  have	  to	  do	  everything	  
to	   prevent	   climate	   change.	  A	   global	  warming	  of	  more	   than	   two	  degrees	   compared	   to	   the	  
preindustrial	   level	   has	   to	   be	   avoided.	   An	   international	   framework	   has	   to	   be	   established	  
within	   the	   next	   two	   years.	   Our	   industry	   makes	   innovational	   decisions	   beyond	   2012	   and	  
needs	   planning	   certainty”(BMU	  30.11.2005).	  Gabriel	   repeatedly	   emphasized	   the	   economic	  
advantages	   of	  measures	   against	   climate	   change.	   Scientific	   knowledge	  was	  mainly	   used	   to	  
indicate	  the	  urgency	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  problem.	  “We	  all	  have	  known	  for	  a	  long	  time:	  Climate	  
change	   threatens	   the	   earth,	   challenges	   mankind	   already	   today	   and	   burdens	   us	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
25	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
26	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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unquantifiable	  costs.	   (…)	  Experts	  estimate	   that	   the	  number	  of	  environmental	   refugees	  will	  
increase	  up	  to	  a	  100	  million	  within	  the	  next	  20	  years”27	  (BMU	  20.02.2006).	  In	  the	  European	  
Parliament	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  2007	  he	  declared:	  “Climate	  change	  is	  reality.	  Scientists	  have	  
told	  us	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  People,	  who	  read	  newspapers	  carefully,	  noticed	  the	  increased	  radical	  
warnings	   of	   scientists.	   The	   alarm	   signals	   hit	   us	   more	   frequently	   and	   more	   close:	   floods,	  
drought,	   increasing	   melting	   glaciers,	   dying	   endangered	   species	   (…)”28	   (BMU	   31.01.2007).	  
Gabriel	   took	  outcomes	  of	   science	  as	  secured	  and	  doubtless.	   “Politics	  of	  climate	  protection	  
evolved	   from	   an	   issue	   of	   dispute	   in	   science	   to	   a	   question	   of	   global	   mankind”29	   (BMU	  
15.06.2007).	  He	  put	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  proposed	  by	  
the	   IPCC.	   Partly	   pathetic	   he	   warned	   about	   melting	   glaciers,	   drought,	   military	   conflicts,	  
environmental	   refugees,	   etc.	   This	   sometimes	   led	   to	   the	  exaggeration	  of	   scientific	   findings,	  
attributing	   them	   to	   regular	   weather	   events.	   In	   a	   governmental	   declaration	   for	   example	  
Gabriel	  said,	  “The	  last	  months	  have	  shown	  us	  the	  danger	  of	  climate	  change.	  In	  Germany	  the	  
winter	  did	  only	  appear	  in	  calendar.	  Perceived	  climate	  change	  is	  accompanied	  by	  clear	  facts	  
of	  science”30	  (BMU	  26.04.2007).	  This	  dramatization	  can	  also	  be	  observed	  when	  the	  schema	  
policy	  action	  occurred.	  His	  statement	  “Science	  gives	  us	  10-­‐15	  years	  to	  prevent	  only	  the	  worst	  
impacts	  of	  climate	  change”	   indicates	  that	   (BMU	  30.10.2006).	  Similar	   in	  an	   interview	   in	  the	  
BILD	  Gabriel	  mentioned,	   “If	  we	   ignore	   the	   scientific	   findings	  of	   the	   IPCC,	  our	   children	  and	  
grandchildren	  will	  curse	  us”	  (BMU	  26.11.2007).	  For	  the	  schema	  policy	  action,	  the	  use	  of	  clear	  
facts	   of	   the	   IPCC´s	   findings	   is	   dominant.	   For	   example	   at	   the	   COP-­‐13	   Gabriel	   said,	   “The	  
industrialized	  countries	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  cut	  their	  emission	  by	  30	  percent	  till	  2020.	  And	  as	  
presented	  by	  the	  IPCC,	  this	  is	  solely	  a	  necessary	  consequence	  if	  a	  worldwide	  reduction	  of	  50	  
percent	   shall	   be	   achieved	   till	   2050”31	   (BMU	   12.12.2007).	   All	   in	   all	   Gabriel´s	   rhetorical	  
behavior,	   similar	   to	   Trittin,	   shows	   the	   dominance	   of	   the	   schema	   problem	   awareness	   and	  
policy	  action.	  While	  seeking	  support	  for	  his	  Ökologische	  Industriepolitik	  scientific	  knowledge	  
was	  used	  to	  point	  to	  the	  problem	  and	  justify	  action	  on	  the	  national	  and	  international	  level.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
6. Conclusion	  	  
	  
Schemata	   matter	   for	   the	   decision	   maker’s	   perception	   of	   scientific	   knowledge.	   While	   the	  
science-­‐policy	  interaction	  has	  been	  intensively	  discussed	  up	  to	  this	  point,	  little	  has	  been	  said	  
about	   the	   influence	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   on	   political	   decision	  makers.	  With	  my	   paper	   I	  
sought	  to	  take	  a	  stance	  in	  this	  debate.	  	  
As	   my	   survey	   unveiled	   schemata	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   rhetorical	   behavior	   of	   all	   three	  
ministers.	  Thesis	  1	  can	  therefore	  be	  verified.	  Furthermore,	  as	  hypothesis	  2	  asserts,	  decision	  
makers	   tended	   to	   assimilate	   new	   information	   with	   existing	   schemata.	   However,	   decision	  
makers	   did	   not	   try	   to	   fundamentally	   change	   scientific	   findings.	   Rather	   they	   strove	   to	  
assimilate	   it	   into	   their	   broader	   cognitive	   structure.	   Since	   the	   IPCC	   provided	   fact-­‐based	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
28	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
29	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
30	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	  
31	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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knowledge	  assimilation	  is	  facilitated	  because	  of	  the	  flexibility	  to	  attribute	  different	  schemata	  
to	   it.	  While	   scientific	   findings	   did	   not	   change	   significantly	   during	  my	   survey,	   it	   led	   to	   use	  
similar	   schemata	   in	   different	   contexts.	   An	   accommodation,	   as	   suggested	   by	   hypothesis	   3,	  
could	   not	   be	   observed	   in	   the	   survey.	   Germany,	   as	   a	   case	   of	   success,	   did	   not	   make	  
accommodation	  very	  likely.	  To	  verify	  whether	  scientific	  knowledge	  can	  initiate	  a	  process	  of	  
learning	  more	  cases	  have	  to	  be	  tested.	  	  
What	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  my	  survey	  for	  the	  role	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	   in	  the	  
political	  process?	  First,	  science	  is	  not	  able	  to	  directly	  influence	  political	  decisions.	  Rather,	  as	  
schema	   theory	   suggests,	   it	   is	   interpreted	   and	   combined	   with	   already	   stored	   knowledge.	  
Broader	   ideas	   therefore	   influence	   the	   schemata	   attributed	   to	   scientific	   knowledge.	   For	  
developing	  these	  ideas,	  structural	  causes	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  cognitive	  structure	  of	  an	  
individual.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  Germany,	  as	  Jänicke	  states,	  path	  dependency	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  
reasons	   for	  Germany´s	   lead	   in	   international	   climate	  change	  politics	   (Jänicke	  2010:	  487	   ff.).	  
Similarly,	   Weidner	   finds	   that	   “In	   sum,	   German	   climate	   policy	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	  
combined	   effects	   of	   a	   certain	   “path	   dependency”;	   “enlightened,	   far-­‐sighted	   self-­‐interest”	  
(ecological	  modernization);	  a	  basic	  moral	  preference	  for	  “equity”	  as	  an	  organizing	  principle;	  
and	  the	  “opaqueness”	  of	  the	  distributional	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  policy	  within	  Germany”	  
(2008:	  374).	  However,	  if	  ideas	  are	  taken	  up,	  it	  is	  due	  to	  the	  individual´s	  perception.	  Second,	  
as	   my	   survey	   discovered,	   schemata	   guide	   the	   perception	   by	   giving	   meaning	   to	   scientific	  
knowledge,	  may	   it	   be	   to	   underline	   the	   threat	   of	   climate	   change	   or	   to	   justify	   the	   policies	  
pursued	  by	  decision	  makers.	   If	  convenient,	  schemata	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  policy	  choices.	  Third,	  
the	  case	  selection	  made	  the	  assimilation	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  very	  likely.	  To	  compare	  my	  
outcomes	  with	  a	  case	  where	  action	  against	  climate	  change	  is	  missing	  or	  even	  changed	  might	  
be	   a	   task	   for	   further	   research.	   Especially	   cases,	   in	   which	   decision	   makers	   fundamentally	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